

DOCUMENTS AND SOURCE MATERIAL

INTERNATIONAL

A1. GROUP OF EIGHT LEADERS, STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA, 16 JULY 2006.

This statement in response to Israel's invasion of Gaza and its war in Lebanon was released during the 15-17 July meeting of the leaders of the Group of Eight (Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, President Jacques Chirac of France, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, Prime Minister Romano Prodi of Italy, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, and President George W. Bush of the United States). The statement was widely interpreted as giving Israel a "green light" to continue its operations in Lebanon and Gaza, having, as a result of U.S. pressure, given priority to the release of the captured Israeli soldiers and a halt to the shelling of Israeli territory and set a number of prerequisites for a return to Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. The text of the statement is available at www.whitehouse.gov.

Today, we the G-8 Leaders express our deepening concern about the situation in the Middle East, in particular the rising civilian casualties on all sides and the damage to infrastructure. We are united in our determination to pursue efforts to restore peace. We offer our full support for the UN Secretary General's mission presently in the region. The root cause of the problems in the region is the absence of a comprehensive Middle East peace.

The immediate crisis results from efforts by extremist forces to destabilize the region and to frustrate the aspirations of the Palestinian, Israeli, and Lebanese people for democracy and peace. In Gaza, elements of Hamas launched rocket attacks against Israeli territory and abducted an Israeli soldier. In Lebanon, Hizbollah, in violation of the Blue Line, attacked Israel from Lebanese territory and killed and captured Israeli soldiers, reversing the positive trends that began with the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, and undermining the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora.

These extremist elements and those that support them cannot be allowed to plunge

the Middle East into chaos and provoke a wider conflict. The extremists must immediately halt their attacks.

It is also critical that Israel, while exercising the right to defend itself, be mindful of the strategic and humanitarian consequences of its actions. We call upon Israel to exercise utmost restraint, seeking to avoid casualties among innocent civilians and damage to civilian infrastructure and to refrain from acts that would destabilize the Lebanese government.

The most urgent priority is to create conditions for a cessation of violence that will be sustainable and lay the foundation for a more permanent solution. This, in our judgment, requires:

- The return of the Israeli soldiers in Gaza and Lebanon unharmed;
- An end to the shelling of Israeli territory;
- An end to Israeli military operations and the early withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza;
- The release of the arrested Palestinian ministers and parliamentarians.

The framework for resolving these disputes is already established by international consensus.

In Lebanon, UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1680 address the underlying conditions that gave rise to this crisis. We urge the UN Security Council to develop a plan for the full implementation of these resolutions.

We extend to the Government of Lebanon our full support in asserting its sovereign authority over all its territory in fulfillment of UNSCR 1559. This includes the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces to all parts of the country, in particular the South, and the disarming of militias. We would welcome an examination by the UN Security Council of the possibility of an international security/monitoring presence.

We also support the initiation of a political dialogue between Lebanese and Israeli officials on all issues of concern to both parties. In addition, we will support the economic and humanitarian needs of the Lebanese people, including the convening at the right time of a donors conference.

In Gaza, the disengagement of Israel provided an opportunity to move a further step

toward a two state solution under the road map. All Palestinian parties should accept the existence of Israel, reject violence, and accept all previous agreements and obligations, including the road map. For its part, Israel needs to refrain from unilateral acts that could prejudice a final settlement and agree to negotiate in good faith.

Our goal is an immediate end to the current violence, a resumption of security cooperation and of a political engagement both among Palestinians and with Israel. This requires:

- An end to terrorist attacks against Israel;
- A resumption of the efforts of President Abbas to ensure that the Palestinian government complies with the Quartet principles;
- Immediate expansion of the temporary international mechanism for donors established under the direction of the Quartet;
- Israeli compliance with the Agreement on Movement and Access of November 2005 and action on other steps to ease the humanitarian plight of the people of Gaza and the West Bank;
- Resumption of security cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis;
- Action to ensure that the Palestinian security forces comply with Palestinian law and with the road map, so that they are unified and effective in providing security for the Palestinian people;
- Resumption of dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli political officials.

These proposals are our contribution to the international effort underway to restore calm to the Middle East and provide a basis for progress towards a sustainable peace, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. The Quartet will continue to play a central role. The G-8 welcomes the positive efforts of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan as well as other responsible regional actors to return the region to peace. We look forward to the report of the Secretary General's mission to the Security Council later this week which we believe could provide a framework for achieving our common objectives.

A2. UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 1701 FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN LEBANON, NEW YORK, 11 AUGUST 2006.

Through the end of July, attempts to draft a resolution for an immediate cease-fire had been stymied by the United States,

which objected to any resolution critical of Israeli actions. As international calls for a cease-fire intensified, however, the United States and France presented a draft resolution on 5 August. Neither Israel nor Lebanon endorsed the draft, and the Lebanese government submitted proposed amendments to the draft resolution (see Doc. B3), which France accepted and the U.S. rejected. After intense negotiations, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1701 calling for a cease-fire in Lebanon and the deployment of an expanded international force to support that cease-fire. The resolution was endorsed by the Lebanese government and Hizballah on 12 August, approved by the Israeli cabinet on 13 August, and went into effect on 14 August. (Hizballah and Israel, however, expressed decidedly different interpretations of the resolution, specifically with regard to Hizballah's disarmament: Israel stated that it allowed for no armed groups in Lebanon and forbid Hizballah forces from returning to southern Lebanon, emphasizing its call for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559; Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah, meanwhile, maintained that Hizballah could not disarm while the Lebanese army was too weak to defend Lebanon from Israel, and insisted on Hizballah's "natural right to resist.") The text of the resolution is available at www.un.org.

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006), 1680 (2006), and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3), and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizballah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing

the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and *encouraging* the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, *welcoming also* its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate, and scope of operation, and *bearing in mind* its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,

Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area,

Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties,

Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent cease-fire and a long-term solution to the conflict,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Calls for* a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the

immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, *calls upon* the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and *calls upon* the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

5. *Also reiterates* its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

6. *Calls on* the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbors, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and *calls on* it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

7. *Affirms* that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and *calls on* all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

8. *Calls for* Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent cease-fire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets, and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;
- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

9. *Invites* the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and *expresses* its intention to be actively involved;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;

11. *Decides*, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate, and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

- (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- (b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue

Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;

- (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
- (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;
- (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, *authorizes* UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure [that] UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, *urges* Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and *expresses* its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

14. *Calls upon* the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and *requests* UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

15. *Decides* further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft:

- (a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related

materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and

- (b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance, or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above; except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training, or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11;

16. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and *expresses its intention* to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent cease-fire and a long-term solution;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

18. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

19. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

A3. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON ISRAELI ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN LEBANON, 23 AUGUST 2006 (EXCERPTS).

Titled "Deliberate Destruction or 'Collateral Damage'?" this report documents Israel's deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure based on "first-hand information gathered by recent Amnesty International research missions to Lebanon and Israel, including interviews with dozens of victims," as well as interviews, official statements, and press reports from the UN, the IDF, and the Lebanese government. The full report, available at www.amnesty.org, calls for a UN investigation into violations of international humanitarian law by Israel and Hizballah. Footnotes have been omitted for reasons of space.

"The civilian population in Lebanon and in northern Israel have been the biggest losers in this senseless cycle of violence that is now exactly one month old. . . . Civilians were supposed to be spared and in this conflict they are not."

—Jan Egeland,
UN Under Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs,
10 August 2006

Introduction

Between 12 July and 14 August, a major military confrontation took place between Hizbullah and Israel, following the capture of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of others, by Hizbullah in a raid across the border between Israel and Lebanon. Israel conducted attacks throughout Lebanon from land, sea, and air, killing some 1,000 civilians. Hizbullah launched thousands of rockets on northern Israel, killing some 40 civilians. Hundreds of thousands of civilians in Israel and Lebanon were displaced.

The briefing that follows summarizes Amnesty International's initial assessment and concerns on the massive destruction of civilian infrastructure in Lebanon that has taken place during the conflict. It is based on first-hand information from a field mission which has visited Lebanon; interviews with dozens of victims of the attacks; official statements and press accounts; discussions with UN, Israeli military, and Lebanese government officials; and talks with Israeli and Lebanese non-governmental groups.

The briefing does not cover in any detail the broader implications of the bombing campaign. It does not evaluate the extent of the human rights impact, including violations of the rights to life or economic, social, and cultural rights such as the right to food, health, and housing, and does not address longer-term economic impact and the massive internal and cross-border displacement. Nor does it address the attacks by Hizbullah into Israel and their impact on civilians—these are being addressed elsewhere. This briefing highlights one aspect of the conflict but underlines the need for an urgent and comprehensive international inquiry into the conduct of the hostilities by both parties.

Since the conflict began, Amnesty International has sent delegates to both Israel and Lebanon and has publicly appealed to both the Israeli government and Hizbullah to abide by the principles of international

humanitarian law. Amnesty International members and supporters around the world have campaigned for a cease-fire, have called for safe passage for trapped civilians and have urged Israel and Lebanon to consent to an investigation by an independent and impartial body into the pattern of attacks by both Israel and Hizbullah.

Deliberate Destruction or “Collateral Damage”?

During more than four weeks of ground and aerial bombardment of Lebanon by the Israeli armed forces, the country’s infrastructure suffered destruction on a catastrophic scale. Israeli forces pounded buildings into the ground, reducing entire neighborhoods to rubble and turning villages and towns into ghost towns, as their inhabitants fled the bombardments. Main roads, bridges, and petrol stations were blown to bits. Entire families were killed in air strikes on their homes or in their vehicles while fleeing the aerial assaults on their villages. Scores lay buried beneath the rubble of their houses for weeks, as the Red Cross and other rescue workers were prevented from accessing the areas by continuing Israeli strikes. The hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who fled the bombardment now face the danger of unexploded munitions as they head home.

The Israeli Air Force launched more than 7,000 air attacks [*sic*—the IDF report referred to in footnoted original gives the number as “15,500 sorties flown over Lebanon, including: more than 10,000 combat missions”—*Ed.*] on about 7,000 targets in Lebanon between 12 July and 14 August, while the Navy conducted an additional 2,500 bombardments. The attacks, though widespread, particularly concentrated on certain areas. In addition to the human toll—an estimated 1,183 fatalities, about one third of whom have been children, 4,054 people injured, and 970,000 Lebanese people displaced—the civilian infrastructure was severely damaged. The Lebanese government estimates that 31 “vital points” (such as airports, ports, water and sewage treatment plants, electrical facilities) have been completely or partially destroyed, as have around 80 bridges and 94 roads. More than 25 fuel stations and around 900 commercial enterprises were hit. The number of residential properties, offices, and shops completely destroyed exceeds 30,000. Two government hospitals—in Bint Jbeil and in Meisal-Jebel—were completely destroyed in Is-

raeli attacks, and three others were seriously damaged.

In a country of fewer than four million inhabitants, more than 25 percent of them took to the roads as displaced persons. An estimated 500,000 people sought shelter in Beirut alone, many of them in parks and public spaces, without water or washing facilities.

Amnesty International delegates in south Lebanon reported that in village after village the pattern was similar: the streets, especially main streets, were scarred with artillery craters along their length. In some cases cluster bomb impacts were identified. Houses were singled out for precision-guided missile attack and were destroyed, totally or partially, as a result. Business premises such as supermarkets or food stores and auto service stations and petrol stations were targeted, often with precision-guided munitions and artillery that started fires and destroyed their contents. With the electricity cut off and food and other supplies not coming into the villages, the destruction of supermarkets and petrol stations played a crucial role in forcing local residents to leave. The lack of fuel also stopped residents from getting water, as water pumps require electricity or fuel-fed generators.

Israeli government spokespeople have insisted that they were targeting Hizbullah positions and support facilities and that damage to civilian infrastructure was incidental or resulted from Hizbullah using the civilian population as a “human shield.” However, the pattern and scope of the attacks, as well as the number of civilian casualties and the amount of damage sustained, makes the justification ring hollow. The evidence strongly suggests that the extensive destruction of public works, power systems, civilian homes, and industry was deliberate and an integral part of the military strategy, rather than “collateral damage”—incidental damage to civilians or civilian property resulting from targeting military objectives.

Statements by Israeli military officials seem to confirm that the destruction of the infrastructure was indeed a goal of the military campaign. On 13 July, shortly after the air strikes began, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz noted that all Beirut could be included among the targets if Hizbullah rockets continued to hit northern Israel: “Nothing is safe [in Lebanon], as simple as that,” he said. Three days later, according to the *Jerusalem*

Post newspaper, a high ranking IDF officer threatened that Israel would destroy Lebanese power plants if Hizbullah fired long-range missiles at strategic installations in northern Israel. On 24 July, at a briefing by a high-ranking Israeli Air Force officer, reporters were told that the IDF Chief of Staff had ordered the military to destroy 10 buildings in Beirut for every Katyusha rocket strike on Haifa. His comments were later condemned by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel. According to the *New York Times*, the IDF Chief of Staff said the air strikes were aimed at keeping pressure on Lebanese officials and delivering a message to the Lebanese government that they must take responsibility for Hizbullah's actions. He called Hizbullah "a cancer" that Lebanon must get rid of, "because if they don't their country will pay a very high price."

The widespread destruction of apartments, houses, electricity and water services, roads, bridges, factories, and ports, in addition to several statements by Israeli officials, suggests a policy of punishing both the Lebanese government and the civilian population in an effort to get them to turn against Hizbullah. Israeli attacks did not diminish, nor did their pattern appear to change, even when it became clear that the victims of the bombardment were predominantly civilians, which was the case from the first days of the conflict.

International Humanitarian Law and War Crimes

International humanitarian law governs the conduct of war and seeks to protect civilians, others not participating in the hostilities, and civilian objects. In an armed conflict, military forces must distinguish between civilian objects, which may not be attacked, and military objectives, which, subject to certain conditions, may be. The principle of distinction is a cornerstone of the laws of war.

Military objectives are those that "by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage." Civilian objects are "all objects which are not military objectives." Objects which are normally considered "civilian objects" may, under certain circumstances, become legitimate military objectives if they are "being used to make an effective contribution to military action." However, in case

of doubt about such use, the object must be presumed to be civilian.

Direct attacks against civilian objects are prohibited, as are indiscriminate attacks. Indiscriminate attacks are those which strike military objectives and civilian objects without distinction. One form of indiscriminate attack is treating clearly separate and distinct military objects located in a city, town, village, or concentration of civilians, as a single military objective. If two buildings in a residential area are identified as containing fighters, bombardment of the entire area would be unlawful.

Disproportionate attacks, also prohibited, are those in which the "collateral damage" would be regarded as excessive in relation to the direct military advantage to be gained. Israel maintains that the military advantage in this context "is not of that specific attack but of the military operation as a whole."

This interpretation is too wide. Overbroad interpretations of what constitutes a military objective or military advantage are often used to justify attacks aimed at harming the economy of a state or demoralizing the civilian population. Such interpretations undermine civilian immunity. A legitimate military advantage cannot be one that is merely "a potential or indeterminate advantage." If weakening the enemy population's resolve to fight were considered a legitimate objective of armed forces, there would be no limit to war.

Israel has launched widespread attacks against public civilian infrastructure, including power plants, bridges, main roads, sea-ports, and Beirut's international airport. Such objects are presumed to be civilian. Israeli officials told Amnesty International that the potential military use of certain items, such as electricity and fuel, renders them legitimate military targets. However, even if it could be argued that some of these objects could qualify as military objectives (because they serve a dual purpose), Israel is obligated to ensure that attacking these objects would not violate the principle of proportionality. For example, a road that can be used for military transport is still primarily civilian in nature. The military advantage anticipated from destroying the road must be measured against the likely effect on civilians, especially the most vulnerable, such as those requiring urgent medical attention. The same considerations apply to electricity and fuel, among other items.

Similarly critical is the obligation that Israel take “constant care to spare civilians, the civilian population, civilian objects, from attack.” This requirement to take precautionary measures in launching attacks includes choosing only means and methods of attack “with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”

It is also forbidden to use starvation as a method of warfare, or to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Some of the targets chosen—water pumping stations and supermarkets, for example—raise the possibility that Israel may have violated the prohibition against targeting objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.

Israel has asserted that Hizbullah fighters have enmeshed themselves in the civilian population for the purpose of creating “human shields.” While the use of civilians to shield a combatant from attack is a war crime, under international humanitarian law such use does not release the opposing party from its obligations toward the protection of the civilian population.

Many of the violations examined in this report are war crimes that give rise to individual criminal responsibility. They include directly attacking civilian objects and carrying out indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks. People against whom there is prima facie evidence of responsibility for the commission of these crimes are subject to criminal accountability anywhere in the world through the exercise of universal jurisdiction.

The Damage to the Infrastructure

The long-term impact of the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure on the lives of the country’s men, women, and children is incalculable. Many have lost their homes while having to cope with the deaths of loved ones or struggling to overcome severe injuries. Many more have lost their livelihoods. Records showing home and property ownership have been destroyed, adding to the difficulties of rebuilding lives.

The head of the country’s Council for Development and Reconstruction, Fadl Shalak, said on 16 August that the damage incurred amounted to US \$3.5 billion: US \$2 billion for buildings and US \$1.5 billion for infrastructure such as bridges, roads, and power plants. A survey compiled by the Council,

based on on-site inspections in central and northern Lebanon and telephone calls to engineers and municipal officials in the south, showed the worst damage to the road network, with more than 120 bridges destroyed (a significantly higher figure than that reported by the government). Fadl Shalak said that replacing the bridge connecting Mount Lebanon to the Bekaa Valley above the Sulfi River on the road to Damascus would cost an estimated US \$65 million. “A beautiful bridge, its columns 70 meters, it’s one of a kind in the whole Middle East. Why would they destroy such a bridge?” he asked. “They could have bombed the beginning and the end and stopped the traffic. But they made a point to bomb this bridge several times.” Another observer said, “This bridge is not used by Hizbullah since it lies in a mountain resort area of Mount Lebanon, far away from the south of Lebanon. Hence it has no strategic value for the Israeli fight against Hizbullah. But it was a beautiful bridge and was the symbol of the reconstruction of Lebanon after the civil war.”

Civilian Homes

“It was a modest house but it was the house in which I was born and brought up [some 70 years ago]; it was where all my childhood memories were. I am very saddened to think that it has been destroyed.”

—Nehmeh Joumaa, a well-known human rights defender, talking to Amnesty International soon after learning of the destruction of his family home in Bint Jbeil.

Thousands of civilian houses were destroyed in the Israeli bombardment in various parts of Lebanon—notably in villages and towns south of the Litani River, in the suburbs of the capital Beirut, and in the town of Baalbak and its surroundings.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) fact sheet of 16 August, 15,000 civilian homes—houses and apartments—were destroyed. This figure is almost certainly an underestimate. The same document reports: “An inter-agency assessment mission to the southern suburbs of Beirut also observed extensive destruction although the full extent is still being assessed. 2,500 housing units have reportedly been destroyed in Haret Hreik and a further 5,000 damaged.”

Amnesty International delegates visiting towns and villages in south Lebanon found

that in village after village houses had been subject to heavy artillery shelling as well as having been destroyed by precision-guided, air-delivered munitions. The accuracy of these munitions and their trajectory were such that they struck one or more of the main support systems causing the building to collapse or partially collapse under its own weight. In Beirut a vast area of densely populated high-rise buildings, which were home to tens of thousands of people most of whom left apparently encouraged by Hizbullah for their own safety, was reduced to rubble by repeated air strikes.

According to the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), on 15 August, 80 percent of the civilian houses had been destroyed in the village of Tayyabah, 50 percent in the villages of Markaba and Qantarrah, 30 percent in Mais al-Jebel, 20 percent in Hula, and 15 percent in Talusha. The following day, UNIFIL reported that in the village of Ghanduriyah 80 percent of the civilian houses had been destroyed, 60 percent in the village of Zibqin, 50 percent in Jabal al-Butm and Bayyadah, 30 percent in Bayt Leif, and 25 percent in Kafra.

When Amnesty International delegates visited the town of Bint Jbeil, in the far south of the country, the center of the city, where there had been a market and busy commercial streets leading from it, was devastated. Every building on the streets was destroyed, extensively damaged, or beyond repair. The streets were strewn with the rubble and in that rubble was clear evidence of the cause of the damage, unexploded munitions, shrapnel, and craters. The Israeli army seemed to have used every type of munition in its arsenal, with air-delivered munitions, artillery shelling, and cluster bomb damage in evidence.

In nearby Ainata, the scene was no different: extensive destruction of civilian houses. The bodies of some of those who had been killed when their homes were destroyed in the second and third week of July, remained under the rubble when Amnesty International delegates visited on 1 August. Their bodies could not be recovered until 14-15 August, after the cease-fire came into effect.

Yusef Wehbe, an entrepreneur who lived for years in Latin America, told Amnesty International about the destruction of his family's house on 21 July: "Twenty-three neighbors were sheltering in my father's house, as it was a more solid house than others in the area. I had spoken to my father on the phone earlier that day and he had

said: 'I am 85 and have lived through all the wars but none were ever like this one; I don't know where all these bombs come from; it is like hell.'

"A few hours later, the house was shelled by the Israeli army and he was killed and my sister's husband was injured; luckily he survived. But a neighbor who went over to the corner of the room where my father was struck was also hit and killed. Until now I don't know if my own house, which is in a different part of the village from my father's house, is still standing; some people said it was destroyed and others said it is still there. I don't know; and I can't go to the village because of the Israeli bombardments. I put a lot of effort and work into my house and the garden. I have been building it since 2000 and I was still adding and improving. And the garden is beautiful, I spend much of my time in the garden when I go back to the village. If the house is destroyed I will have to rebuild it. Our family home had been destroyed once before in 1970 and we rebuilt it. Now it has again been destroyed. And if my own house has also been destroyed I'll have to rebuild it."

Water Facilities

Wells, water mains, storage tanks, pumping stations, and water treatment works have been destroyed throughout south Lebanon. The water service in the entire country has also been disrupted, as water pipes running beneath roads have been extensively damaged when the roads above have been bombed. The cost of the damage to water facilities was estimated by the Lebanese government to be more than US \$70 million as of 8 August.

The damaged and destroyed water facilities include four wells at Fakr al-Din, as well as the pipes between the Fakr al-Din station and Wadi al-Rashid. Storage tanks in Sidon district, Bint Jbeil, and al-Wazani were damaged or destroyed. Two pumping stations were destroyed in the Baalbak-al-Asseera region, as well as the water line between Sebaat and al-Dulbi. In the al-Litani area, the al-Qasimiyya channel, Channel 900, and the line from Joun to al-Awwali were hit.

Such extensive damage to water facilities carries a grave risk of disease. Daniel Toole of the United Nations Children's Fund noted that the lack of clean water was becoming life-threatening in south Lebanon during the fighting, where Israel's bombardment of roads and bridges has also cut off outside water supplies. "Sanitation is a big issue,"

he said. "Without proper sanitation children will get diarrhea, they will get sick and they will die."

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also noted that lack of access to villages in the south meant remaining inhabitants had been largely without clean water. Some who had fled the border village of Rmeish told ICRC delegates that local people were drinking foul water from an irrigation ditch.

As noted above, international humanitarian law seeks to protect objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. While water pipes might sustain collateral damage, it appears that storage tanks, pumping stations and water treatment plants have been directly targeted by Israeli forces, and it is difficult to understand how they could have been regarded as military objectives. Moreover, even if some objective were military, there is little evidence to suggest that Israel exercised the requisite level of precaution to take constant care to avoid the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.

Electricity and Fuel Supply

Electrical facilities, power plants, and fuel stations have suffered extensive damage. At least 20 fuel depots have been completely destroyed in bombing raids and 25 petrol stations have been destroyed or severely damaged. A statement of 14 July noted: "IDF air and naval forces attacked three gasoline stations in southern Lebanon as part of the effort to damage the Lebanese infrastructure that works to support terror activity."

The south of the country was completely without power by the time the cease-fire was announced. Electrical lines and cables across the country have been cut, and the destruction of the roads and bridges, as well as access restrictions imposed by the Israeli military, have prevented repair and assessment crews from working. Electrical supply in Beirut remains intermittent and averaged about 12 hours a day at the close of the conflict. Israeli air strikes on the weekend of 12 and 13 August, immediately before the cease-fire came into effect, left the cities of Sidon and Tyre without electricity. The cost of the damage to the electricity sector is estimated at about US \$208 million.

Environmental Damage

The attack on Lebanon's largest power station at Jiyeh had both an immediate adverse impact on the population and long-term implications for the environment and

the economy. Israeli forces bombed the Jiyeh power station, about 25 km south of Beirut, and its fuel tanks on 13 July and again on 15 July. The resulting fire, which burned for three weeks, coated the surrounding areas with a fine white dust of pulverized concrete and filled the air with black soot. In addition, that attack caused 15,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to leak into the sea. The oil slick has contaminated more than 150 km of the Lebanese coastline and has spread north into Syrian waters. The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) has characterized it as one of the worst environmental disasters seen in the region. The cost of a comprehensive clean-up was estimated to be US \$150 million, with work taking up to a year.

"The recent oil spill off the coast of Lebanon is an environmental disaster, and may affect the livelihood, health, and future prospect of Lebanon and the surrounding countries," said Stavros Dimas, the European Commissioner in charge of efforts to contain the damage.

According to the Lebanese environmental NGO Greenline: "The fuel tanks released a cloud of polyaromatic hydrocarbons, dioxins, and particulate matter, and all of these could cause cancer, respiratory problems, and hormonal problems."

Achim Steiner, Under Secretary General of the United Nations and Executive Director of UNEP, said: "It is . . . a sad fact that the environment—so vividly underlined by the oil slick and the blackened, damaged coastline—is also a victim with all the repercussions for livelihoods, human health, economic development, ecosystems, fisheries, tourism, and rare and endangered wildlife." The damage to two of the emerging sectors of the Lebanese economy—tourism, which was projected before the conflict to generate 12 percent of the nation's gross domestic product this year, and commercial fishing—has not yet been assessed.

The bombing of electricity transformers such as the one that was hit in Sidon on 12 August released polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into the atmosphere. Lebanon still uses transformers that contain parts that were made with PCBs, despite an international ban on the substance. Greenpeace has warned that PCBs "are chemicals that are bio-accumulative and persistent so when you inhale them they stay in your body, and they cause cancer."

The bombing of factories that made products such as glass, foodstuffs, and plastics

also released these chemicals and chlorine into the atmosphere in central areas of Lebanon, potentially affecting up to two million people.

Under international humanitarian law, care must be taken to protect the environment against widespread, long-term, and severe damage. Methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage are forbidden.

Roads and Bridges

Roads and bridges, despite their use primarily by civilians, have been declared a target by the Israeli military. The extensive damage to the land transportation network during the first three weeks of bombing alone has been estimated by the Lebanese government at more than US \$300 million. The Israeli government stated on 14 July that "The roads in Lebanon are used to transport terrorists and weapons to the terror organizations operating from Lebanese territory against civilians in Israel." The Lebanese government's list of roads damaged to 31 July indicates that repeated Israeli shelling had put nearly 100 roads largely out of commission, with some 200,000 square meters of road completely destroyed.

Amnesty International's delegates in Lebanon saw many roads hit by precision-guided munitions whose warheads created craters 4 m-5 m deep and about 7 m wide. This cratering has generally been justified as necessary to impede the movement of Hizbullah fighters, but more often than not the craters did not close the road, as they were to the side rather than in the middle of the road. Travel by car remained possible by simply driving around the craters, although it impeded trucks carrying supplies and aid.

The UN's Food and Agriculture Organization warned that damage to roads and bridges interrupted the food supply chain in Lebanon, providing the recipe for "a major food crisis." When the Israeli air force severed Lebanon's last significant road link to Syria on 4 August, it stopped a convoy carrying 150 tons of relief and cut what the UN called its "umbilical cord" for aid supplies. Israel said it had destroyed the bridges along Lebanon's main north-south coastal road to prevent Syria from rearming Hizbullah.

The number of bridges destroyed has been put at about 80 by the Lebanese government and 120 by the Council for Development and Reconstruction. Some bridges were repaired, only to be bombed again. On 7 August OCHA reported that Israeli forces

had again bombed a temporary bridge over the Litani River, cutting off road access between Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut. The original bridge had already been destroyed by Israeli strikes. As a result, Tyre, Lebanon's fourth largest city with a population of more than 100,000 and sheltering additional tens of thousands more displaced people, was cut off from relief supplies.

On 6 August, officials of UNIFIL again attempted to secure a go-ahead from the Israeli authorities to build a new temporary bridge over the Litani River to facilitate the transport of vital humanitarian supplies to the beleaguered residents of the south. Israel denied permission, warning that any new bridge would also be blown up. According to UN officials, the Israeli military said that UNIFIL engineers would themselves become a target if they attempted any repairs to the bridge. The Israeli military also warned that any movement south of the Litani River would be prohibited, with the exception of UNIFIL and Red Cross vehicles, and that any other moving object would be attacked. A Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) convoy transporting emergency medical supplies and fuel was stuck north of the Litani on 7 August and had to pass four tons of supplies via a human chain over a distance of 500 m. A tree trunk was used as a makeshift bridge.

"Because the crossing is out, we had to transfer by hand, which left us very exposed," said Christopher Stokes, MSF Coordinator in Lebanon. "Although we had not received any security guarantees, the decision was taken to go ahead because the convoy contained very urgently needed medical and surgical supplies, especially if fighting near Sour [Tyre] keeps increasing. . . . And our convoy travelling from Sour [Tyre] had a close escape when two explosions occurred just 100 m away from them. [Surveillance] drones and jets could be heard all along the trip."

Under international humanitarian law, the parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment, and personnel, protect relief consignments, and facilitate their rapid distribution. In addition, the personnel participating in humanitarian relief actions, as well as the objects used for humanitarian relief operations, must be respected and protected.

Airports

All of Lebanon's airports have been attacked, some repeatedly, including Beirut's

international airport. The Beirut airport was one of the first targets to be struck; a first aerial attack turned the airport's fuel tanks into fireballs, while a second wave left craters in the three main runways. While the central facilities, including the control tower, were spared, the airport was rendered inoperative. Two days later, according to CNN: "In an unusual deal that the United States helped broker, a runway at the Beirut airport was repaired long enough to enable six planes—one carrying former Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Miqati—to take off. Israeli forces soon after bombed the runway again." The damage as of 31 July was estimated at US \$55 million by the Lebanese government.

An IDF statement issued on 14 July noted that the airport and its fuel tanks had been targeted because it "is used as a central hub for the transfer of weapons and supplies to Hizbullah." However, the statement suggested that the attacks were also intended as part of the policy of making the Lebanese government "pay a high price" for hosting Hizbullah: "The Lebanese government is blatantly violating the resolution of the UN Security Council which calls, among other things, for the removal of the Hizbullah terrorist organization from the Lebanese border, and is therefore fully responsible for the current situation."

Ports

Israeli forces attacked seaports along the coast, including three of the country's main ones—in Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. A missile from an Israeli combat helicopter put out of use Beirut's modern lighthouse on 15 July, and an antenna vital for maritime operations was hit in Tripoli on 18 July. The old lighthouse was also hit. It is difficult to see what legitimate purpose these attacks could have had, given that the Israeli Navy was blockading the port anyway.

On 17 July, the Israeli Air Force launched a pre-dawn attack on the port of Beirut, striking a fuel tank, which exploded, killing two workers. The port of Beirut, which had been badly damaged in previous conflicts, had recently undergone an extensive reconstruction program.

The Israeli Air Force also struck at the seaport in Tripoli, Lebanon's second-largest city, also in the north of the country.

Hospitals

Hospitals in many parts of the country have sustained shelling damage, particularly in the south, but the main threat to their con-

tinued operation came from fuel shortages, road destruction, and the ongoing blockade. Two government hospitals—in Bint Jbeil and in Meis al-Jebel—were completely destroyed in Israeli attacks, and three others were seriously damaged.

The Lebanese Ministry of Public Health estimated that around 60 percent of the country's hospitals had ceased to function as of 12 August due to fuel shortages. Eight hospitals, including three in the southern suburbs of Beirut, were forced to close because bombs were falling around them daily.

One hospital, alleged by Israel to be a Hizbullah headquarters, was directly attacked. On 2 August, Israeli commandos in helicopters, supported by fighter planes and drones, raided al-Hikmah hospital in Baalbak in the eastern Bekaa Valley. The Israeli army said they captured five Hizbullah members there. However, according to local residents, the five were not captured at the hospital but in the home of one of them. They added that one of those seized, local merchant Hasan Nasrallah, had been confused with the Hizbullah leader who has the same name. Reuters reported that the supporting air strikes killed 19 people, including four children. A statement from the IDF said that "Hezbollah weapons, computers, computer storage media, and a large amount of vital intelligence materials were seized. Ten terrorists were killed during the operation and five others were captured by Israeli forces. There were no IDF or civilian casualties."

There were reports that al-Hikmah hospital was subsequently razed in an air strike, but journalists who visited five days later found the building still standing, although they noted that "there is no question there was a fight. The rear of the hospital showed heavy damage, and much of it is pockmarked with bullets and small mortars. There are burned-out cars in the hospital parking lot, and a field just beyond is burned down to scorched grasses."

The hospital was reportedly financed by an Iranian charity with links to Hizbullah. A Hizbullah official in Beirut was cited as saying the hospital had been evacuated several days earlier as a precaution after Israeli forces attempted an earlier, similar operation.

In the village of Tebnine, in South Lebanon, only hours before the cease-fire came into effect on 14 August, Israeli forces fired cluster bombs all around the government hospital, where hundreds of civilians were sheltering, damaging its outer walls.

Residents of nearby villages, including elderly and disabled people who had not been able to reach the next main town of Tyre, had sought shelter there. The Israeli army had been shelling the surrounding of the hospital since the end of July, and those sheltering in the hospital were afraid to leave.

Hospitals are by nature "civilian objects" and may not be attacked unless they are being used for military purposes. If Hizbullah was indeed using the al-Hikmah hospital as a headquarters or base, then they rendered it subject to attack, although Israel would still have been under an obligation to take precautions to protect civilians and avoid the loss of life or injury to civilians.

Communications

Israeli air raids on 22 July hit several transmission stations used by Lebanese television and radio stations. These included Future TV, New TV, and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBCI), none of which had any links with Hizbullah, as well as the Hizbullah-backed al-Manar TV. They were also used by mobile phone networks. One LBCI official, Suleyman Shidiac, Chief Engineer at the relay station at Fatqa in the Kesrwan mountains north-east of Beirut, was killed and two others were injured.

Israeli forces have repeatedly targeted Hizbullah's al-Manar television station, for example with three strikes in as many days from 14 July. The transmitters and relay stations of several other Lebanese television stations have also been attacked. According to the IDF: "Al Manar has for many years served as the main tool for propaganda and incitement by Hezbollah, and has also helped the organization recruit people into its ranks. Hezbollah operates undisturbed from within Lebanon, and constitutes a severe terrorist threat to the people of Israel and to IDF soldiers." An IDF official told Amnesty International delegates that al-Manar was being used for military communications, but failed to provide any evidence to support this claim when questioned.

The fact that al-Manar television broadcasts propaganda in support of Hizbullah's attacks against Israel does not render it a legitimate military objective. Only if the television station were being used to transmit orders to Hizbullah fighters or for other clearly military purposes could it be considered to be making "an effective contribution to military action." Even then, Israel would need to take required precautions in attacking it and choose a manner aimed to avoid

harm to civilians. Amnesty International is not aware of claims by Israel that the other stations were performing military functions.

Dozens of mobile telephone masts have been struck, disabling many mobile telephone networks, and ordinary telephone lines and exchanges have suffered extensive damage, estimated at US \$99 million.

Economic Infrastructure

Privately owned factories and businesses across the country—economic entities whose destruction could not be seen to offer a military advantage outweighing the damage to civilians—have also been subjected to a series of debilitating air strikes, dealing a further crippling blow to the shattered economy. The Lebanese government estimated that unemployment in the country has now reached an approximate figure of 75 percent.

The production facilities of companies in key industrial sectors, including Liban Lait in Baalbak, the country's largest dairy farm; the Maliban glass works in Ta'neil, Zahleh; the Sada al-Din plastics factory in Tyre; the Fine tissue paper mill in Kafr Jara, Sidon; the Tabara pharmaceutical plant in Showeifat, Aaliyah; the Transmed shipping warehouse on the outskirts of Beirut; and the Snow lumbermill in Showeifat, Aaliyah, have been disabled or completely destroyed. Industry minister Pierre Gemayel said that nearly two-thirds of the industrial sector had been damaged, and at least 23 large factories and dozens of small and medium-sized factories had been bombed.

Waji al-Bisri, acting head of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, estimated that US \$200 million in direct damage was inflicted on the industrial sector, with dairy, cement, glass, and prefab housing factories hit hardest. Nearly all shops and small businesses close to the Israeli border have reportedly received direct hits from artillery and air strikes.

Even before the latest attack, large-scale factories were a rarity in Lebanon. Maliban, the second largest glassworks in the Middle East, was an exception, with production reaching some 200 tons a day for sale around the region. It was one of five Bekaa factories destroyed. A journalist who visited the ruined factory floor said: "It's impossible to discern what this space was used for. All that's visible is churned-up soil with twisted metal, powdered glass, and wrecked machinery. It is possible to discern the cause of the disruption, though: four distinct

craters have been gouged out of the factory floor.”

One of the plant managers said: “The planes came around 12:45 so most people were at lunch, fortunately. Two people were killed, both Indians, and two injured. If they had come an hour earlier or later it would have been a massacre . . . they even destroyed the workers’ residence.”

The Liban Lait dairy farm and plant in the Bekaa Valley, the leading producer of milk and dairy products in Lebanon, was completely destroyed in an aerial attack on 17 July. According to a local dairy farmer, the dairy factory was hit at 3 A.M. by a barrage of missiles, and the plant was completely destroyed. The dairy, whose products were distributed all over the country, employed about 400 local staff. At least 1,500 Bekaa residents have reportedly lost their source of livelihood.

According to the Catholic charity Caritas in Lebanon: “The Israeli Army is making the situation even worse for Lebanese civilians by targeting warehouses and factories. In fact, food storage houses in particular have become the target.”

Amnesty International’s delegates noted numerous attacks on commercial outlets such as supermarkets and automotive repair outlets. They found that supermarkets were targeted almost certainly with the same type of munition as aimed at houses, but seemingly delivered via a higher trajectory in order to inflict most damage to their interiors and to the products stored in them. In some cases, supermarkets were set on fire. There were similar attacks on automotive repair outlets, leading to fires. There was no evidence that such fires were caused by stored munitions. Shrapnel, casings, and assorted debris indicated a common pattern of destruction in all the places visited. The destruction of supermarkets, often the single initial attack on a town or village, seems to have been intended to hasten the departure of the residents. The reasons behind the destruction of auto/electro/mechanic outlets remain the subject of speculation.

For example, in the village of Hanaway, where the pattern of damage was similar to other villages, major commercial outlets were destroyed, including supermarkets and also car and automotive repair workshops. Streets were cratered, the craters being of a size probably caused by air strikes rather than artillery. Other craters along streets indicated heavy artillery.

Lebanese agricultural production has likewise been badly hit, partly because the produce cannot be transported by road, and partly due to the danger of bombing and shelling for those working in the fields. On 4 August, for example, missiles from Israeli aircraft hit a fruit-packing warehouse near the Syrian border, killing at least 23 mainly Kurdish farm workers. Citrus crops on the coastal plains of southern Lebanon have been left to rot, while poultry farms have been unable to obtain chicken feed due to the blockade and as much as 80 percent of the stock has died.

Blockades

“Any vehicle of any kind travelling south of the Litani River will be bombarded, on suspicion of transporting rockets, military equipment and terrorists.”

—leaflet addressed to “the Lebanese people,” signed the “State of Israel,”
7 August 2006

Israel incapacitated Beirut’s airports, bombarded most of the country’s bridges and arterial roads, and imposed a naval and air blockade. Access to the south of the country even for humanitarian agencies was severely disrupted. With land routes cut, the naval blockade made bringing aid shipments in by sea impossible without military approval, which proved extremely difficult to secure. An ICRC ship full of supplies destined for Tyre was “red-lighted” for several days before being allowed to dock on 12 August. Israel claims that the blockade was necessary to cut off weapons and supplies to Hizbullah.

“The time for improved access is long overdue,” insisted ICRC head Jakob Kellenberger on 11 August. “Even life-saving, emergency evacuations so desperately needed are, at best, delayed for days. We also face enormous obstacles to bringing in aid convoys loaded with essential foodstuffs, water and medicines for trapped civilians.”

During the conflict, around 100,000 civilians were trapped in southern Lebanon, afraid to flee following Israeli threats to target all moving vehicles, and in light of Israeli Justice Minister Haim Ramon’s widely reported remark: “All those now in south Lebanon are terrorists who are related in some way to Hezbollah.” Some were unable to move because of their age or disability, or simply because they had no access to transport. Residents were rapidly running

out of food, water, and medicines, and the ICRC reported that those who had managed to escape the region were arriving at aid stations in increasingly desperate conditions.

By 13 August, according to the Associated Press: "Aid convoys were stuck in ports or at warehouses because Israel refused to guarantee their safety on the roads. Thousands of people trapped in southern villages were believed to have run out of food and medicine and were drinking unsafe water."

A few days earlier, the UN's Jan Egeland had warned that fuel supplies would run out within days, paralyzing hospitals and shutting down electricity across the country. "The fuel situation is the single most worrying humanitarian crisis at the moment," he said. "If there's one thing that will be the most critical—even more critical than food—over the next days and weeks, it's fuel." At the time, two tankers with 87,000 tons of fuel oil and diesel were docked outside of Israel's naval blockade off Lebanon's Mediterranean coast, but they had refused to bring the supplies in without a written guarantee of safety.

Due to the incapacitation of electricity supply stations, hospitals and other health centers were relying on fuel to run generators. Power is essential to run operating theaters, life-saving equipment including incubators for newborns, and refrigeration for vaccines and treatments including insulin. It is also essential for safe water provision and hygiene.

Even north of the Litani River, provision of much-needed food and medical assistance was difficult to coordinate. Damage to roads and bridges by bombardment necessitated taking lengthy detours along minor roads or dirt tracks, through which big trucks can only pass with difficulty.

While blockades are not prohibited per se by international humanitarian law, they must not prevent foodstuffs and other essential supplies from reaching the civilian population. The parties to the conflict may not deny consent to relief operations on arbitrary grounds, and can only control the content and delivery of humanitarian aid to the extent necessary to ensure that aid convoys are not being used, for example, for military purposes.

Within days of the cease-fire, an estimated 200,000 Lebanese had returned home, according to the Lebanese Higher Relief Council on 16 August, including 40 percent of

people who had been sheltering in schools and public places.

ARAB

B1. PA PRIME MINISTER ISMAIL HANIYEH, "AGGRESSION UNDER FALSE PRETENSES," GAZA, 11 JULY 2006.

This op-ed by PA Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh was published in the Washington Post following the launch of Israel's Operation Summer Rains and is available at www.washingtonpost.com.

As Americans commemorated their annual celebration of independence from colonial occupation, rejoicing in their democratic institutions, we Palestinians were yet again besieged by our occupiers, who destroy our roads and buildings, our power stations and water plants, and who attack our very means of civil administration. Our homes and government offices are shelled, our parliamentarians taken prisoner and threatened with prosecution.

The current Gaza invasion is only the latest effort to destroy the results of fair and free elections held early this year. It is the explosive follow-up to a five-month campaign of economic and diplomatic warfare directed by the United States and Israel. The stated intention of that strategy was to force the average Palestinian to "reconsider" her vote when faced with deepening hardship; its failure was predictable, and the new overt military aggression and collective punishment are its logical fulfillment. The "kidnapped" Israeli Cpl. Gilad Shalit is only a pretext for a job scheduled months ago.

In addition to removing our democratically elected government, Israel wants to sow dissent among Palestinians by claiming that there is a serious leadership rivalry among us. I am compelled to dispel this notion definitively. The Palestinian leadership is firmly embedded in the concept of Islamic *shura*, or mutual consultation; suffice it to say that while we may have differing opinions, we are united in mutual respect and focused on the goal of serving our people. Furthermore, the invasion of Gaza and the kidnapping of our leaders and government officials are meant to undermine the recent accords reached between the government party and our brothers and sisters in Fatah and other factions, on achieving consensus for resolving the conflict. Yet Israeli

collective punishment only strengthens our collective resolve to work together.

As I inspect the ruins of our infrastructure—the largess of donor nations and international efforts all turned to rubble once more by F-16s and American-made missiles—my thoughts again turn to the minds of Americans. What do they think of this?

They think, doubtless, of the hostage soldier, taken in battle—yet thousands of Palestinians, including hundreds of women and children, remain in Israeli jails for resisting the illegal, ongoing occupation that is condemned by international law. They think of the pluck and “toughness” of Israel, “standing up” to “terrorists.” Yet a nuclear Israel possesses the 13th-largest military force on the planet, one that is used to rule an area about the size of New Jersey and whose adversaries there have no conventional armed forces. Who is the underdog, supposedly America’s traditional favorite, in this case?

I hope that Americans will give careful and well-informed thought to root causes and historical realities, in which case I think they will question why a supposedly “legitimate” state such as Israel has had to conduct decades of war against a subject refugee population without ever achieving its goals.

Israel’s unilateral movements of the past year will not lead to peace. These acts—the temporary withdrawal of forces from Gaza, the walling off of the West Bank—are not strides toward resolution but empty, symbolic acts that fail to address the underlying conflict. Israel’s nearly complete control over the lives of Palestinians is never in doubt, as confirmed by the humanitarian and economic suffering of the Palestinians since the January elections. Israel’s ongoing policies of expansion, military control and assassination mock any notion of sovereignty or bilateralism. Its “separation barrier,” running across our land, is hardly a good-faith gesture toward future coexistence.

But there is a remedy, and while it is not easy it is consistent with our long-held beliefs. Palestinian priorities include recognition of the core dispute over the land of historical Palestine and the rights of all its people; resolution of the refugee issue from 1948; reclaiming all lands occupied in 1967; and stopping Israeli attacks, assassinations, and military expansion. Contrary to popular depictions of the crisis in the American media, the dispute is not only about Gaza and the West Bank; it is a wider national con-

flict that can be resolved only by addressing the full dimensions of Palestinian national rights in an integrated manner. This means statehood for the West Bank and Gaza, a capital in Arab East Jerusalem, and resolving the 1948 Palestinian refugee issue fairly, on the basis of international legitimacy and established law. Meaningful negotiations with a non-expansionist, law-abiding Israel can proceed only after this tremendous labor has begun.

Surely the American people grow weary of this folly, after 50 years and \$160 billion in taxpayer support for Israel’s war-making capacity—its “defense.” Some Americans, I believe, must be asking themselves if all this blood and treasure could not have bought more tangible results for Palestine if only U.S. policies had been predicated from the start on historical truth, equity, and justice.

However, we do not want to live on international welfare and American handouts. We want what Americans enjoy—democratic rights, economic sovereignty, and justice. We thought our pride in conducting the fairest elections in the Arab world might resonate with the United States and its citizens. Instead, our new government was met from the very beginning by acts of explicit, declared sabotage by the White House. Now this aggression continues against 3.9 million civilians living in the world’s largest prison camps. America’s complacency in the face of these war crimes is, as usual, embedded in the coded rhetorical green light: “Israel has a right to defend itself.” Was Israel defending itself when it killed eight family members on a Gaza beach last month or three members of the Hajjaj family on Saturday, among them 6-year-old Rawan? I refuse to believe that such inhumanity sits well with the American public.

We present this clear message: If Israel will not allow Palestinians to live in peace, dignity, and national integrity, Israelis themselves will not be able to enjoy those same rights. Meanwhile, our right to defend ourselves from occupying soldiers and aggression is a matter of law, as settled in the Fourth Geneva Convention. If Israel is prepared to negotiate seriously and fairly, and resolve the core 1948 issues, rather than the secondary ones from 1967, a fair and permanent peace is possible. Based on a *budna* (comprehensive cessation of hostilities for an agreed time), the Holy Land still has an opportunity to be a peaceful and stable economic powerhouse for all the Semitic people of the

region. If Americans only knew the truth, possibility might become reality.

B2. HIZBALLAH LEADER HASAN NASRALLAH, MESSAGE TO THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, N.P., 17 JULY 2006 (EXCERPTS).

Nasrallah's speech, originally aired on Hizballah-affiliated al-Manar television, was his first after Hizballah's attack on Israeli soldiers on 12 July (Operation True Promise) and Israel's bombing and invasion of southern Lebanon that followed. Of note: in addressing the Arab leaders, Nasrallah's reference to Hizballah as "adventurers" is a direct response to the 14 July statement from the Saudi foreign ministry referring to Hizballah's actions as "miscalculated adventures." The full transcript is available at electronicintifada.net.

In this first address that I give in these days following Operation True Promise, I would like to say a few words—a word to the Lebanese people, a word to the resistance fighters, a word to the Zionists, and a word to the Arab rulers. I will not offer words to the international community because I have never for one day believed that there is any such thing as an international community, just as many in our nation feel.

First, I say to the Lebanese people: dear people—who embraced the resistance, by whom the resistance was victorious, and for whom the resistance won its victory on 25 May 2000—this people who were the makers of the first victory in the history of the Arab struggle with the Israeli enemy, despite the basic inequality in forces, and in spite of the fact that the majority of our Arab brothers and the majority of our Muslim brothers abandoned us and despite the silence of the whole world, this Lebanese people made the miracle of the victory that stunned the world and humiliated the Zionists. Those Zionists look upon this people in a special, unique way because they accomplished in the history of the struggle with them a special and unique accomplishment.

The battle today is no longer a battle over prisoners or the exchange of prisoners. It might be said that the Zionist enemy is responding any time there is any operation where men are captured anywhere in any part of the world, by any army or any state that has borders and regulations. What is taking place today is not a response to a capture of their soldiers; it is a squaring of accounts with the people, resistance, state, army, political forces, regions, villages, and

families that inflicted that historic defeat on that aggressive usurper entity that has never accepted its defeat.

Today, therefore, this is a total war that Zionism is waging to clear its whole account with Lebanon, the Lebanese people, the Lebanese state, the Lebanese army, and the Lebanese resistance, in revenge and reprisal for the victory they won on 25 May 2000.

Dear steadfast, mujahid, and noble people, I know that the overwhelming majority of this people, in their minds, hearts, wills, culture, thoughts, love, passion, and sacrifice are a people of nobility, dignity, honor, distinction, and pride, not a people of servility, subservience, submissiveness, and surrender. I say to you that in this battle we are faced with two choices—not we, as in Hizballah, or as in the resistance, the Hizballah resistance—but Lebanon as a state, a people, an army, a resistance, and a political power—we are faced with two choices: either to submit today to the conditions that the Zionist enemy wants to dictate to us all, using the pressure, support, and backing it has from America, from around the world, and, I'm sorry to say, from Arabs.

Either we submit completely to its conditions, which means taking Lebanon into an Israeli age under Israeli domination—in total frankness this is the extent of the matter—or we stand steadfast. That is the other choice: that we persevere, that we persevere and confront. I, relying on God the exalted, and on my faith in Him and the mujahidin and in you, knowing this people and this enemy, just as I always used to promise you victory, now I promise you victory once again.

During the Grapes of Wrath in 1996, or Operation Settling of Accounts in 1993, in the beginning they had the upper hand and our situation was much worse. But today, the situation is different. Believe me, and I mean this, the situation now is different. All that we need is to persevere, stand steadfast, and confront them united, and I know and I will bet that the majority of our people are a people of steadfastness, a mujahid people who can sacrifice, who have no need for pep talks. What I'm saying now is only by way of completing the idea, and affirming the choice, and clarifying what this means.

Now, as for my words to the resistance fighters, to my dear and beloved brothers: upon them rest the hopes of every Lebanese, every Palestinian, every Arab, every Muslim, every free and decent person in this world, every oppressed, tortured victim of injustice, every lover of steadfastness,

courage, dignity, values, and nobility—the characteristics they embody by their presence on the field of battle and in their fight with this enemy, the fight of valiant heroes. I say to them: today, after God the highest, you are the hope of our nation. You are the symbol of our nobility. Our honor is in your hands.

This honor is yours and by means of you, our honor is preserved. After God the exalted, it was you who were responsible for the victory of 2000. Today it is you, before all others, who are responsible for preserving the victory, for achieving liberation, standing steadfast, and with honor. This places demands on you that you, in practice, have proved until now and during these days that you are entirely worthy of, as you are worthy of our esteem. Those who put their trust in you, after God, their charge is great, the reward will be grand, and the mighty victory—a clear triumph—is near.

To the Zionists, to the people of the Zionist entity at this hour I say to them: you will soon discover how foolish and stupid are your new rulers, your new leaders. They do not know how to assess reality. They have no experience in this area. You Zionists say in opinion polls that you believe me more than you believe your officials. So now I call on you to listen well and believe me. Today we have persevered despite the attack that took place last night in the southern suburbs. However the attacks multiply in every village, neighborhood, street, and home in Lebanon, there is no difference between the south Beirut suburbs, the city of Beirut, or any home in south Lebanon, in the Biqa', or the north, or Mount Lebanon, or any corner of Lebanon.

The equation has now changed. I will not say today that if you strike Beirut, we will strike Haifa. I will not tell you that if you hit the south Beirut suburbs, we will hit Haifa. You wanted to get rid of that equation, so now we and you have got rid of it in actuality. You wanted open warfare, and we are going into open warfare. We are ready for it, a war on every level. To Haifa, and, believe me, to beyond Haifa, and to beyond beyond Haifa. We won't be alone in paying a price. Our houses will not be the only houses destroyed. Our children will not be the only children killed. Our people will not be the only ones displaced. Those days are past. That was how it was before 1982 and before the year 2000.

Those times have come to an end. I promise you those times have passed. There-

fore you must also bear the responsibility for what your government has done, for what that government has undertaken. From now on, you wanted open warfare, so it will be open warfare. You wanted it. Your government wanted to change the rules of the game, so let the rules then be changed. You don't know today whom you're fighting. You are fighting the children of Muhammad, of 'Ali, of al-Hasan, of al-Husayn, of the Prophet's family, the Prophet's companions.

You are fighting a people who have faith such as no one else on the face of the earth possesses. And you have chosen open warfare with a people who take pride in their history, their civilization, and their culture, and who also possess material power, ability, expertise, knowledge, calm, imagination, determination, steadfastness, and courage. In the coming days it will be between us and you, God willing.

As to the Arab rulers, I don't want to ask you about your history. I just want to say a few words. We are adventurers. We in Hizballah are adventurers, yes. But we have been adventurers since 1982. And we have brought to our country only victory, freedom, liberation, dignity, honor, and pride. This is our history. This is our experience. This is our adventure.

In the year 1982 you said and the world said that we were crazy. But we proved that we were the rational ones, so who then was crazy? This is something else and I don't want to get into an argument with anyone. So I tell them simply: go bet on your reason and we will bet on our adventure, with God as our supporter and benefactor. We have never for one day counted on you. We have trusted in God, our people, our hearts, our hands, and our children. Today we do the same, and God willing, victory will follow. . . .

B3. LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER FUAD SINIORA, SEVEN-POINT PLAN FOR ENDING THE WAR IN LEBANON, BEIRUT, 7 AUGUST 2006.

Originally proposed at the 25 July Rome meeting attended by Lebanese prime minister Siniora, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and a number of European and Arab foreign ministers, the seven-point plan received the unanimous backing of the Lebanese Council of Ministers and the full support of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and it was reaffirmed by the emergency Arab League meeting in Beirut on 7 August. Ignored by the United States at the Rome conference, the

key points of the plan were eventually worked into UN Security Council resolution 1701. The text of the plan is available at www.lebanonundersiege.gov.lb.

1. An undertaking to release the Lebanese and Israeli prisoners and detainees through the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross].

2. The withdrawal of the Israeli army behind the Blue Line, and the return of the displaced to their villages.

3. A commitment from the Security Council to place the Shaba' Farms area and the Kfar Shouba Hills under UN jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully settled. While in UN custody, the area will be accessible to Lebanese property owners there. Further, Israel surrenders all remaining landmine maps in South Lebanon to the UN.

4. The Lebanese government extends its authority over its territory through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese state as stipulated in the Taef national reconciliation document.

5. The UN international force, operating in South Lebanon, is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate, and scope of operation, as needed, in order to undertake urgent humanitarian and relief work and guarantee stability and security in the south so that those who fled their homes can return.

6. The UN, in cooperation with the relevant parties, undertakes the necessary measures to once again put into effect the Armistice Agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel in 1949, and to insure adherence to the provisions of that agreement, as well as to explore possible amendments to or development of said provisions, as necessary.

7. The international community commits to support Lebanon on all levels and to assist it in facing the tremendous burden resulting from the human, social, and economic tragedy which has afflicted the country, especially in the areas of relief, reconstruction, and rebuilding of the national economy.

B4. HIZBALLAH LEADER HASAN NASRALLAH, INTERVIEW WITH AL-JAZEERA, 20 JULY 2006 (EXCERPTS).

The following excerpts are from a long interview with Nasrallah conducted by al-Jazeera Beirut bureau chief Ghassan Bin-Jiddu and aired by al-Jazeera on 21 July 2006. The full tran-

script of the interview is available at www.informationclearinghouse.info/article14152.htm.

Do you expect that the battles will be long? Are you preparing, as one of the generals inside [Lebanon] warned, for a war of attrition?

The battle here, if we want to answer these questions, we should discuss the background of the battle. We are not convinced at all—perhaps during the first hours we can say that the [Israeli] reaction was a natural reaction to the capturing of Israeli soldiers—but hours after this, the issue has gone far beyond a reaction to the capturing of the soldiers. The Israelis entered [Lebanon] with a plan. The officials in charge of this plan, commanders, and news media used to talk about it with varying degrees, which we will analyze later. However, they, for example, spoke about destroying Hizballah, not the missile force, but destroying Hizballah. Some sides say the dismantling of the military structure of Hizballah. Others said the annihilation and destruction of the missile force of the military structure, and others said we cannot destroy the military force of Hizballah, but we want to pain Hizballah and weaken this force. Then they said pushing Hizballah far from the borders. Those who talk about pushing Hizballah 10 or 20 km know that this does not mean pushing the missile force far from the borders. The one who attacks Haifa, Afula, and farther villages, and has the power to attack farther than this, then the story of 10 or 20 km is considered simple details. Some sides said that the objective of the operation is to free the two prisoners. I assure you that the objective of the operation is not to free the two prisoners. At any rate, the slogans on the one hand, and the objectives that were announced for the operation on the other, means that the operation would take a long time. I cannot say one week, two weeks, three weeks, one month, more, or less. This issue depends on the field developments on the one hand, and the political developments on the other. . . .

Excuse me. Does it depend on you or on Israel?

On us and on them. The course of the battle—I will say how—for example, today, the talk began in Israel, and this is a logical analysis, to the effect that the Israeli military operation has reached its peak. What is more than this? I will answer you. What can the Israelis do more than what they did?

What is left is the ground incursion, which is costly at any rate. There is an argument, not among the politicians on the political level, even on the military and security levels there is a real argument on the level of the military and security commands. What is left is the ground incursion. Besides the incursion, everything the Israelis could do [they] have done. So, they have reached the peak. Now, they have one of two choices: When they reach the peak they either proceed horizontally, in other words, continue with the same standard or the dose [preceding word in English] of the peak, or they will begin to decline. So, the military operation will begin to decline and to calm down gradually to pave the way for a political settlement. How much time would this take? This depends on developments. When time drags, [when] the north is brought to a halt, northern Israel—excuse me, I apologize, I mean northern occupied Palestine—there are two million Israelis who are either in shelters or outside the area, displaced outside the area. The entire economy in the north is brought to a halt. The factories, trade, tourism, and economic movement are all brought to a halt. The number of the killed and injured on their side could be much less than on our side, but this is natural. This is because they have a huge arsenal. Our arsenal is not for destruction, retaliation, and revenge, but a deterrent arsenal. They have a huge destructive power. There is no exaggeration here. They also have shelters. Give me one village in the south that has shelters in it. Up till now a large part of the people of the south are still in the south. Had there been shelters, the people would have remained there and would not have left. No one likes to live in school, to be given rations. However, on their side, from the borders to deep in the north, there are shelters in the settlements. So, it is only logical that the number of those killed and wounded on their side is smaller than on our side. However, what affects the economy and the pressure the people are exposed to as a result of displacement and living in shelters. . . . They promised them a quick operation within a few days. The first day and then the second day passed, and every day they say three or four times in the Israeli news media that they have killed me, killed the Hizballah leaders, and made false achievements. So, what is next? Until when will this continue? The Israeli society is so far rallying round the government. We experienced this in 1993, in 1996, and in past wars, but this solidarity will begin to vanish

with the passage of time. So, if the military operation took a horizontal direction or began to decline, then the peak that is higher than this is the ground incursion. I am sure that the ground incursion will be a catastrophe for the Israeli army. This is not a threat. You know from day one that I speak calmly and objectively on these issues. . . .

It is a matter of time now. I rule out that the Israelis can make a military achievement. It is a matter of time. On the one hand, there is our military steadfastness, and on the other there is the political and popular steadfastness. They [the Israelis] are wagering on seeing the country's political front break up and weaken, and on seeing a decline in the popular support for the resistance in order to achieve political results. We, on the other hand, are wagering on our steadfastness and that of our people, and on seeing a decline in the Israeli internal support for the military operation and on the pressures on the enemy's government, the beginning of which we began to see today. . . .

. . . Some say that Hizballah might be strong militarily on the ground now, at least as you have said, but it seems that it is internationally isolated, excluded, and chased. It is also politically embarrassed at home. . . . The government was neither aware of that decision [to capture the soldiers], nor does it bear its consequences or adopt it. Is this reasonable to happen? . . .

Politically, the international community, first, has never been with us. So I cannot say that is not with us, isolating, and forsaking us just today. It has never been with us. Moreover, it has mostly been against. For example, we have been listed on the US terrorism list since they created the terrorism list. We are among the first to be listed on that list. Some European countries also list us as terrorists. The position of the international community is clear. Consequently, we are not surprised by the international community. We have never wagered on the international community. The international community adopts international resolutions of which Israel implements nothing. Even Resolution 425 was not implemented by Israel; we imposed it on Israel. It has implemented none of the resolutions concerning the Palestine question. It has implemented none of the resolutions concerning the occupied Arab territories. For us, this is neither a new factor, nor a factor of pressure.

Regarding some Arab positions, this is new. True, this is new. In the past, some

Arab regimes abandoned the resistance and the resisters. I am so objective and realistic, so today we deem it acceptable if the Arab regimes are neutral. Just like that. If you view the Hizballah rhetoric, we accepted such stands from them. Perhaps the brothers in Palestine—and rightfully so—have a different rhetoric. Their circumstances are much harder than ours. So they always attack, accuse, and denounce the regimes and rulers. This is not part of our rhetoric and literature. Why? We have forgotten them. To attack someone, you need to suppose that he exists. But if you feel that he does not exist in the first place, then you would be troubling yourself to no avail if you attack him. Once, we used to ask the international community to condemn the executioner and to ask for mercy for the victim. We reached a stage where we began to say we accept that they condemn both the executioner and the victim. . . .

With regard to the Arab regimes, we expect them only to sit on the fence. And, if they do not want to sit on the fence, then they should at least equate between us and Israel. We even agree to have them equate between the victim and the executioner. But we did not expect them to take part in shedding the blood of the victim, nor to give a cover for the crimes of the executioner. Yes, this was a surprise. . . .

. . . The world community gave Israel permission to destroy the resistance in Lebanon. Some Arabs then came to provide a cover and encourage Israel to continue the battle and to tell Israel that this is the golden and historic opportunity to destroy the resistance in Lebanon. . . .

Today, I do not expect anything from certain Arab rulers. Now if you ask me about what I expect from the nation, I know that if you examine the hearts of all people in the Arab and Muslim nations, they are with us. . . . I have no doubt about this. I am even certain that some sons, daughters, and wives of some Arab rulers are with us. But I tell the Arab rulers, I do not want your swords and I do not even want your hearts. To say it in Lebanese slang, the only thing I want from you is [to] leave us alone. Sit on the fence and have nothing to do with us. You have said what you said, thank you, go and rest. . . .

Let me go back to your question about not telling them [the Lebanese government] or asking them. First, the government statement, on the basis of which we participated in the government, talks about the Lebanese government's endorsement of resistance

and its national right to liberate the land and the prisoners. How could a resistance liberate prisoners? Go to George Bush for example? I cannot and will not go to George Bush. When you talk about the resistance's right, you are not talking about the Foreign Ministry's right. You talk about an armed resistance, and you establish in the government statement its right to liberate the land and the prisoners. So, I represent a resistance [movement] and I have weapons. This was the government statement according to which the government won the vote of confidence from the chamber of deputies. That was the first point.

Second, all that was said at the dialogue table is available on tapes. Yes, I told them we would maintain the border calm. That was our policy. . . . However, there are two issues that can stand no postponement. The first is the prisoners issue, for this involves humanitarian suffering. The second is any attack on civilians. I told them on more than one occasion that we are serious about the prisoners issue and that this can only be solved through the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. Of course, I used to make hints in that respect. Of course I would not be expected to tell them on the table I was going to kidnap Israeli soldiers in July. That could not be.

You told them that you would kidnap Israeli soldiers?

I used to tell them that the prisoners' issue, which we must solve, can only be solved through the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. . . . Nobody told me: no, you are not allowed to kidnap Israeli soldiers. I was not waiting for such a thing. Even if they told me no you are not allowed [nothing would change]. I am not being defensive. I said that we would kidnap Israeli soldiers in meetings with some of the key political leaders in the country. I do not want to mention names. When the time comes for accountability I will mention names. They asked whether this would resolve the prisoners issue if this happens. My answer was that it was logical for such an act to solve the prisoners' issue. I assure you that our assessment was not wrong. I am not being stubborn. In the entire world, tell me about any state, any army, or any war that was waged because some people kidnapped two soldiers, or even took hostages, not military soldiers. Tell me about a war that was waged against a state because of two soldiers. This has never happened in history. Nor has Israel ever done it before. However, what is happening

today is not a reaction to the kidnapping of two soldiers. . . .

. . . Finally, I will tell you how any resistance in the world operates. If I want to kidnap or capture two Israeli soldiers, the political leadership would make the decision and hand it to me, but even my brothers [in the leadership] should not know that this would happen at such a time and such a place. If 60 to 70 people know such details, would a capturing operation be successful? No, no such operation would be successful, let alone when informing a government of 24 ministers, 3 key leaders, political forces, and political blocs. At the dialogue table we hold discussions and only one hour later the minutes of the sessions become available to [foreign] embassies. So do you expect me to tell the world I am going to capture [soldiers]? . . .

. . . True, I had not informed the Lebanese government, but neither had I informed my closest allies. Syria and Iran had not been informed. No Syrian or Iranian person had had any prior information. They had not been informed, and I had not consulted any of them. We are a resistance group operating on Lebanese soil. We have prisoners in Israeli prisons. It is our natural right to restore them. There is a major government statement that stresses this right, according to which we acted. . . .

I want to add something else. Hizballah has always given priority to the Lebanese national interest over any other interest. On the table of [national] dialogue, I argued with them and I told them that you have known us for 23 or 24 years. I was ready to tell them, some of them and not all of them, what battles they fought in the interest of foreign parties and not in the interest of Lebanon. I asked them to bring anything against Hizballah and say if it did anything in Lebanon or fought any war in Lebanon that was in the interest of another party, and not the interest of Lebanon. They could not give me a single example. . . .

I do not have to defend myself here as Hizballah or the resistance masses with regard to the national interest. I say that we are fighting the war of national interest because Israel wants to humiliate Lebanon, subjugate Lebanon, and control Lebanon. If it succeeds in this war, then any future government in Lebanon would need the approval of Olmert and the Israeli Mossad. Not only the U.S. ambassador, the French ambassador, or the British ambassador, but we will have a fourth one to endorse the

elections law, the government, the new president; and that is Mr. Olmert. . . .

The people know us very well. Let me defend ourselves here a little bit. I normally do not like to talk about personal matters. Today, before the homes of the people were destroyed, the homes of Hizballah leaders and cadres were destroyed. Can you mention the name of one of our publicly-known brothers whose home was not destroyed? The families of Hizballah leaders and cadres are displaced, just like the other people. Therefore, we were the first to pay the price. Today, our sons, families, relatives, and dear ones are in the battlefield. No one is hiding anything. All of Hizballah is in the battle. Hizballah masses are in the battle. Are we that crazy, that I and my brothers want to sacrifice our souls, our families, our honorable masses, and our dear ones in order to have Syria return to Lebanon, or to postpone the international tribunal, or for the sake of the Iranian nuclear file? Can you imagine such positions! This is an insult. It is an insult to our patriotism and commitment. Yes, we are friends of Syria and Iran, but for 24 years we benefited from our friendship with Syria and Iran for the sake of Lebanon. There are others who benefited from their friendship with Syria for their own seats in power, houses, wealth, and bank accounts. But, for me, tell me where my bank accounts are? Tell me where is the palace that I built as a result of my connections to the Syrian officials in Lebanon? Never! Hizballah has never taken advantage of these friendships except for the benefit of Lebanon. Today, Hizballah is not fighting for the sake of Syria or the sake of Iran. It is fighting for the sake of Lebanon. Yes, the result of this battle in Lebanon will be seen in Palestine. If it ends in victory, it will be victory there too; and if, God forbid, it ends in defeat, then the Palestinian brothers will face difficult and tragic conditions. But, God willing, there will be only victory.

Here, what does victory mean, and what does defeat mean? When we say that you have achieved victory, then what do you mean? . . .

To succeed in defense is victory. . . . We were not the ones who began the war or the ones who launched a large-scale war. It is not from the first moment after we captured two soldiers that we began to shell Nahariya, Haifa, Tiberias, and Safad and launched war. No. Even in advancing, the Israelis were much faster than us. We were patient in the

hope that things would stop at this point because we do not want to take our country to war. However, they launched war and we went to war. Victory here does not mean that I will enter and capture northern Palestine and liberate Nahariya, Haifa, and Tiberias. This is not in our rhetoric or slogans. This is a process that concerns the Palestinians and the nation. This is another issue. The victory we are talking about is that when the resistance survives. When its will is not broken, then this is victory. When Lebanon is not humiliated and its dignity and honor are maintained, and when Lebanon stands fast alone in front of the fiercest military power and does not accept any humiliating conditions regarding a settlement of the issue, then this is victory. When we are not defeated militarily, then this is victory. As long as there is a missile that is fired from Lebanon and targets the Zionists, as long as there is one fighter who fires his rifle, and as long as there is someone who plants a bomb against the Israelis, then this means that resistance is still there.

I tell you now—some people say that this is the eighth day [of the war] and others say it is the ninth day. . . . Our absorption of the strike is victory, and our continuation with the confrontation is victory. In addition to this, when the Israelis begin to make concessions [then this means victory]. In the first day, there were no negotiations. Now, the Israelis began to talk about negotiations. In the first day, they said that they want to destroy Hizballah. . . . Now, even the Israeli officials do not use the language of destroying Hizballah. There is not even the language of dismantling Hizballah. Today, some sides talk about disarming Hizballah, and other sides talk about weakening Hizballah's missile force. Even the destruction of Hizballah's military force is no longer a military target. The Israelis today know that through military force they cannot dismantle Hizballah's military power or missile force. They have to deal with this through politics. This is an Israeli failure. Every Israeli failure is success to us. It is victory for us.

... Let's put the other parties aside. You have a memorandum of understanding with General Aoun. Has what is currently taking place shaken the pillars of the memorandum of understanding and your cooperation with the Free Patriotic Movement?

No, not at all. First, the memorandum of understanding talked clearly about first re-

leasing the prisoners and liberating the rest of the [occupied] Lebanese territories, and afterward discussing a strategy for national defence. This is what we began to discuss. Hizballah has neither taken advantage of Lebanon to liberate Palestine, nor worked toward restoring the seven villages, which are Lebanese territories. It carried out an operation to capture [Israeli soldiers], because the government's policy statement stipulates the release of prisoners and the liberation of Lebanese territories. So, what we did is a national Lebanese action, even in the regional sense of the word. This [operation] was carried out within, not outside, the context of the memorandum of understanding signed between us and the Free Patriotic Movement. . . .

... If you are certain of your military capabilities, what then do you fear? Do you fear the internal or the external...

We fear only God Almighty. Second, I want to assure you that we do not fear the internal front. They are trying to play on the sectarian divisions. They know that playing on the sectarian divisions is dangerous. It is true that it threatens the resistance, but it also threatens the state project, the Cedar Revolution, and the great democratic model that George Bush is talking about. . . . If they want to play on the differences between Sunnis and Shi'a, Muslims and Christians, or Druze and Shi'a, it will be dangerous for the country. However, they will not succeed in this at this time. Today, the Americans are playing on the divisions between Sunnis and Shi'a in Iraq. . . . But today they cannot incite people. Let's take the Sunnis for example; are they going to incite them against us, the Shi'a? Why? . . . Today, we are Shi'a fighting Israel. Our fighting and steadfastness is a victory to our brothers in Palestine, who are Sunnis not Shi'a. So, we, Shi'a and Sunnis, are fighting together against Israel, which is supported, backed, and made powerful by America. . . .

What does it mean to you when the army says that it will fight if a ground attack is launched against Lebanon, especially when such a statement is made by the defense minister? He, along with the army commander and senior officers, said that they will be in the field to fight the battle of honor. What does that mean to you?

This is not something new from this army, this institution, and this cadre. Before the liberation, we offered martyrs together.

In the battles of Jabal al-Rafi and Arab Salin, there were martyrs from both the Lebanese Army and the resistance. The Lebanese Army, despite its limited capabilities, has always confronted the warplanes and every attack against the country. The army, as well as the resistance, has limited capabilities. We do not say that the resistance has huge capabilities; it has limited capabilities. However, the army has the same will and bravery that the resistance has. The difference between the resistance and the army is that the latter is an official classic institution, while the first is a popular resistance that carries out guerilla warfare.

ISRAEL

C1. PRIME MINISTER EHUD OLmert, REMARKS ON "REALIGNMENT PLAN," N.P., 9 JUNE 2006 (EXCERPTS).

The following excerpts are from Israeli prime minister Olmert's interview with the Financial Times, in anticipation of his planned trip to meet with European leaders. The full text of the interview is available at www.ft.com.

You talked before the election about permanent borders resulting from what we now call realignment. You said in a Time magazine interview that they might not be permanent but they would be pretty close. How negotiable with the international community are those borders?

... What I wanted to say, and what I want to say now, is I want to separate from the Palestinians—OK—into defensible borders that can provide security for the people of Israel, of course in consideration of demographic changes that took place in the territories since 1967 and to which the president referred in his famous letter of the 14th of April 2004 as you all recall, I'm sure. ...

... If we can, you know, negotiate specific borders that can be acceptable to achieve peace, [that is] better. That is why always I prefer an agreement and negotiations.

If, as appears at this time, there won't be negotiations because the Palestinian are not ready, because they are not prepared to assume responsibility, because the extremist, fundamentalist, religious radical government of Hamas is not prepared and Abu Mazin is too weak, then I'll try and discuss this issue with the international community. ... If the Palestinians will be ready again, I'd more than

be happy to negotiate with them because I want to have another side accountable, with a clear address, that I can charge with responsibility for events that may take place in the future. What they say is if they don't come, if they are not ready, if all of us agree that they are not ready, what are we going to do? Wait forever? Waiting is the worst. It's playing into the hands of the extremists that don't want any development and that are ready to sacrifice it with blood and terror. And I say, I am not playing into the hands of the extremists.

If you will not allow the more moderate Palestinians to take over and assume responsibility, then I move forward. But I move forward after talking to Tony Blair and to Jacques Chirac and to George W. Bush and to others and trying to prepare a framework that appears to me reasonable to the international community. And at any given time in the future, even the Palestinians will then be able to meet their requirements as posed by the international community, then we will continue to talk.

So it does not preclude any future negotiations with Palestinians. It will perhaps only reduce the scope of differences because if Israel pulls out from a large part of the population or of the territories, then much less will be left for any possible future discussions between us and the Palestinians. But at the same time it's also true that if they will not come and if we will withdraw into certain lines and if we will separate this with a big fence as we intend to do and that will be the practical border separating us from the Palestinians, it may last for many years. I don't know. ...

There are doubts in Europe about whether an independent Palestinian state is really possible given the facts on the ground at the moment.

We are not talking about the facts on the ground at the moment. I am talking about changing these facts on the ground. I am talking about pulling out from territories. Don't tell me. ... Look, I think that the position of the Palestinians is they want 100 percent of every bit of territory. It's a negotiating position that will have to be discussed. I'm not ... I don't believe that there is one European leader, serious European leader, [who] would say that unless the Palestinians receive 100 percent of every demand of theirs, there can be no peace. I'm sure that the Europeans, with their experience, with their depth of understanding and

historical memory which is so dominant in the minds of many European leaders, they know that territories were exchanged, that populations even moved sometimes, that territorial adjustments were made in order to create better circumstances for a peaceful solution. In one format or another, in one manner or another, at the end of the day we will have to find ways to do it here. And I don't believe there is a serious European leader that would say no, either we give the Palestinians accurately 100 percent of what they want or there will never be peace. This is childish and the Europeans are not children.

Recently you were quoted as saying talk of a humanitarian crisis was propaganda.

First of all, we will do everything in our power to assist the Palestinians to cope with the humanitarian needs in the territories irrespective of any formal obligations of one type or another. We will make sure that there will not be any humanitarian disaster in the territories. Full stop. That's because we don't want one child in any Palestinian place to suffer from the intransigence and the recklessness and the lack of responsibility by this leadership. At the same time, I have to say, knowing that all the basic foods are in abundance in Gaza that they have all the ingredients that they need for another three, four months. To say that there is a humanitarian crisis already. No. It's a gross exaggeration which I don't have to accept. But I'll do everything that I can to help them cope with whatever humanitarian demands there may be.

On a more technical level, is the government trying to do anything to solve the problem that has arisen that banks are very reluctant to make legitimate transfers between Israel and the territories because they fear legal action in the U.S.? As a result even Israeli businesses are losing out.

It's not convenient when you have terrorists. You have to make all kinds of adjustments and it's not always very, very convenient. What can we do? You know, there could be a much simpler solution. Just get rid of the terrorists and life will be simpler for everyone. So, you know, you asked me about the problem we created. American banks are not prepared to make any transfers or any legal transfers or any financial transfers through their banks, and they will not cooperate with any bank that makes

such transfers into what may turn out to be terrorist hands. And who am I to complain to the American banks? I respect them because they don't want to provide any opportunity to terrorists. Now, I talked to President Mubarak the other day, also a very impressive man, and he said to me: how can the Egyptian banks transfer money to Gaza? They will be blamed by the international banking community for cooperating with terror. This is an Arab leader. So, look, you know, the starting point is that Hamas is there. Let's get rid of what is there rather than change the entire universe to adjust to that which from the outset is totally unacceptable.

Do you have any worries though that if the Palestinian Authority institutions do start to collapse that actually Israel will have to start to take responsibility again for providing services?

Why, if the Palestinian administration will collapse as a result of their own inadequacies and failures, why will it become almost automatic that the responsibility of providing services will be Israeli? We want to separate from them. We are out of Gaza. I mean, that will not happen in the West Bank of course. It will happen in Gaza. But I remind you we pulled out of Gaza completely, we are not there. We are only helping them because the international community prefers these arrangements and we want to help them. So we still maintain the customs envelope. I don't need the customs envelope for Israel. They want Israel to maintain the customs envelope because if Israelis will not collect the monies that are due to them, these monies will disappear in the private pockets of all the gangsters that control some of their institutions. So we are ready to assist, we are ready to cooperate, we are ready to provide services, but we are not responsible for the failures of the Palestinian government and the extremists that dominate them to do what needs to be done for them.

C2. PRIME MINISTER EHUD OLMERT, ADDRESS TO THE KNESSET ON THE CAMPAIGN IN GAZA AND THE WAR IN LEBANON, JERUSALEM, 17 JULY 2006 (EXCERPTS).

This address is Prime Minister Olmert's first to the Knesset after Israel launched its offensive in Lebanon. The full text is available at www.knesset.gov.il.

The campaign we are engaged in these days is against the terror organizations

operating from Lebanon and Gaza. These organizations are nothing but “sub-contractors” operating under the inspiration, permission, instigation, and financing of the terror-sponsoring and peace-rejecting regimes, on the Axis of Evil which stretches from Tehran to Damascus.

Lebanon has suffered heavily in the past, when it allowed foreign powers to gamble on its fate. Iran and Syria still continue to meddle, from afar, in the affairs of Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, through Hizballah and Hamas.

Even if last Wednesday’s criminal attack against an IDF patrol was carried out without the consent of the Lebanese government and without the assistance of its military, this does not absolve it of full responsibility for the attack which emanated from its sovereign territory. Just as the fact that the chairman of the Palestinian Authority opposes terrorism against Israel does not relieve him and the PA of their responsibility for the attack carried out from their territory against our soldiers in Kerem Shalom. . . .

Radical, terrorist, and violent elements are sabotaging the life of the entire region and placing its stability at risk. The region in which we live is threatened by these murderous terror groups. It is a regional—as well as global—interest to take control and terminate their activity.

We can all see how the majority of the international community supports our battle against the terror organizations and our efforts to remove this threat from the Middle East.

We intend to do this. We will continue to operate in full force until we achieve this. On the Palestinian front, we will conduct a relentless battle until terror ceases, Gilad Shalit is returned home safely, and the shooting of Qassam missiles stops.

And in Lebanon, we will insist on compliance with the terms stipulated long ago by the international community, as unequivocally expressed only yesterday in the resolution by the 8 leading countries of the world:

- The return of the hostages, Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser and Eldad Regev;
- A complete cease fire;
- Deployment of the Lebanese army in all of Southern Lebanon;
- Expulsion of Hizballah from the area, and fulfillment of United Nations Resolution 1559.

We will not suspend our actions. On both fronts we are exercising self-defense in the most basic and essential sense. In both cases, it is a matter whose importance and significance go far beyond the size of the military units involved.

We are at a national moment of truth. Will we consent to live under the threat of this Axis of Evil or will we mobilize our inner strength and show determination and equanimity?

Our answer is clear to every Israeli, and it echoes today throughout the entire region. We will search every compound, target every terrorist who assists in attacking the citizens of Israel, and destroy every terrorist infrastructure, everywhere. We will persist until Hizballah and Hamas comply with those basic and decent things required of them by every civilized person. Israel will not agree to live in the shadow of missiles or rockets aimed at its residents. . . .

All of us—Jews, Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Circassians—now stand as one person, as one nation, subjected together to the same hatred and malice, and fighting against it in consensus and partnership. When missiles are launched at our residents and cities, our answer will be war with all the strength, determination, valor, sacrifice, and dedication which characterize this nation.

There is nothing we want more than peace and good neighborly relations—in the east, north, and south. We seek peace, we pursue peace and we yearn for peace. At the same time, there is nothing we reject more than an attempt to harm us and make us give up our right to live here, in our land, in security and peace. . . .

C3. FOREIGN MINISTER TZIPI LIVNI, ISRAEL’S OBJECTIVES IN THE LEBANON WAR, JERUSALEM, 24 JULY 2006 (EXCERPTS).

Israeli foreign minister Livni issued this statement on the arrival of Condoleezza Rice to Israel two days before Rice attended a conference in Rome to discuss a cease-fire in Lebanon. (Livni did not attend.) The full text is available at www.mfa.gov.il.

The goals of Hizballah, as part of an axis of terror which also includes Syria, Iran, and Hamas, are to set the region in flames and dictate the Israeli-Palestinian agenda. We cannot and will not let them succeed.

The entire free world, led by the United States, shares a common understanding of the threats that we all face. The free world also shares a common vision about the way

to resolve the situation in Lebanon. These goals were established in Security Council Resolution 1559 and in the recent G8 statement:

- The kidnapped Israeli soldiers must be released;
- Hizballah must be disarmed;
- and Lebanese sovereignty must be exercised, by the Lebanese Armed Forces, in all of Lebanon.

Let me be clear. Israel has no conflict with the people of Lebanon and does not want to undermine the government of Lebanon. But Israel also has no higher responsibility than to defend its citizens from attack.

Now, perhaps more than ever, a window of opportunity has been opened. This is a moment of truth for the government of Lebanon—to take responsibility over its entire territory, as is expected of any government. And this is a moment of truth for the international community. A cease-fire alone will create a vacuum that Hizballah will fill with more terrorism.

There is a need for the international community to assist the Lebanese government to confront and disarm the Hizballah terrorists, in order to create a better future for all the peoples of the region. Israel is ready and willing to cooperate with the international community on the basis of these mutual goals.

C4. DEFENSE MINISTER AMIR PERETZ, STATEMENT TO THE KNESSET ON THE LEBANON WAR, JERUSALEM, 31 JULY 2006 (EXCERPTS).

Israeli defense minister Peretz's address to the Knesset, delivered as Israel's campaign began to elicit outcry from the international community as a result of its impact on the civilian population of Lebanon, and from Israeli circles for the Israeli military's failure to produce a clear victory or articulate a clear goal or strategy in Lebanon, is available in full at www.mfa.gov.il.

The government of Lebanon abandoned the population of southern Lebanon to Hizballah, which made them into a shield for their military power. Our current operation against Hizballah has revealed its true face. We found rockets and missiles stored in private homes, sometimes in special rooms built to conceal them. We found Katyusha launchers firing from the courtyards of mosques, churches, and schools. We found terrorists and munitions in every village, operations and communication

centers in private homes. We found terror as part of everyday life in south Lebanon. Terror flourished, and the government of Lebanon remained silent.

While we make every effort to target only terrorist elements, Hizballah strikes indiscriminately at Israeli civilians and population centers. They send suicide bombers to explode in buses and restaurants. While they have no regard for human life, not giving a second thought to using innocent Lebanese civilians for their purposes, we make every effort to avoid harming uninvolved civilians. When they succeed in killing innocent train workers in Haifa, they consider it an operational success. When we kill innocent civilians, we consider it a tragedy to be investigated thoroughly.

I would like to state categorically: There is no Israeli pilot or commander who would issue an order to hurt uninvolved civilians. Whenever we intend to target a munitions depot in a building in which a family resides, Israeli intelligence devotes great effort to find the telephone number of that family, phone them, and ask them to leave the house two hours before in order that they not be harmed. Yet, despite this, people are sometimes killed. This is a war zone, and the terrorist organizations know that their presence in populated areas will lead to civilian casualties. . . .

We believe in the future of our region. It is therefore our aim to weaken the terrorist elements that threaten regional stability and to strengthen moderate elements, enabling them to assume responsibility for their own lives, their own countries. We do not wish to wage war against the Lebanese people, just as we have no interest in waging war against the Palestinian people. We are fighting terrorism in Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority.

At the same time, we demand that those who maintain sovereignty also take responsibility. We cannot continue to differentiate between sovereignty and responsibility—they go hand in hand. . . .

As a man of peace, I say: We must not agree to an immediate cease-fire. Only by overcoming terrorism can we achieve peace.

C5. PRIME MINISTER EHUD OLMERT, ADDRESS TO KNESSET ON THE WAR IN THE NORTH, JERUSALEM, 14 AUGUST 2006 (EXCERPTS).

Israeli prime minister Olmert's address to the Knesset, delivered in the wake of the UN Security Council's passing of resolution 1701 and in the face of rising

domestic criticism of the government's handling of the Lebanon war; is available in full at www.pm.gov.il.

Approximately one month ago, the government approved the IDF operation against the Hizballah terrorists—following an act of terror, during which volleys of Katyushas were fired on communities in the north, killing 8 IDF soldiers and kidnapping Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser and Eldad Regev.

The overall responsibility for this operation rested on me as prime minister. I have no intention of sharing, nor do I ask to share, this responsibility with anyone. This responsibility derives from my position as prime minister of Israel.

The decision by the Government of Israel not to ignore the situation echoed and will continue to echo in world capitals both near and far. It clarified to all peoples and nations that the State of Israel would not absorb any more attacks on its sovereignty and would not restrain itself anymore when its citizens were harmed. Furthermore, it would respond with force to any act of terror, from the north or the south, from the east or from the sea. Anywhere.

Madam speaker, ladies and gentlemen, members of the Knesset, this morning, UN Resolution 1701 became valid. This resolution contains a list of responsibilities which are meant to fundamentally change the situation on our northern border. . . .

This resolution is a political accomplishment for Israel, however its significance is crucial to all nations of the free world, who struggle against global terror. The entire international community is partner to the perception that the terror state which established itself in Lebanon must be destroyed. The UN Security Council unanimously, and with the support of the 15 member states, accepted this historic resolution, which clarifies that there is only Israel and Lebanon. There is no longer a state within a state. There is no longer sponsorship for a terror organization by a state. And no longer is a terror organization allowed to operate within Lebanon, as the long arm of the axis of evil which reaches out from Teheran to Damascus, uses Lebanon's weakness and transforms it, its citizens, and its infrastructure into a tool for its war.

Finally, a single address for discussions regarding the northern border has been determined, and that is the sovereign government of Lebanon. It will bear full responsibility for all its territory, and the entire international system is committed to this.

We will continue to act to bring the kidnapped soldiers home. We will do so with perseverance and with all the means at our disposal, both overt and covert, as decreed in the Security Council Resolution. . . .

The IDF operation over the last month, in the air, at sea, and on land—brought about a change in the regional strategic balance, first and foremost vis-à-vis the Hizballah terror organization.

IDF soldiers dealt a severe blow, the dimensions of which are not yet publicly known, to this murderous organization, its military and organizational infrastructure, its long-term ability, the huge weapons arsenal it has built and accumulated for many years, and also to the self-confidence of its people and leaders.

In every battle, in every encounter with Hizballah terrorists, the fighters of the IDF had the upper hand—of this there is no doubt. The leaders of this terrorist organization went underground, and from there they are busy spreading lies and hiding the truth of the cost to them and their people.

In this regard, I wish to clarify: these people will not be exonerated. They will not be exonerated. We will continue to chase them wherever they are and for however long it takes. It is our moral duty to ourselves, and we have no intention of apologizing or asking permission from anyone to do so.

We also suffered painful blows, both on the home front and on the front line. We did not mislead ourselves when we embarked, because of the inevitability of the circumstances, on this war. We did not mislead anyone. We said rockets would fall, missiles would fall, and that we would pay a heavy price—the most precious—in human lives.

We spoke out of a sense of profound responsibility toward every citizen on the front line and on the home front, and we knew—we all knew—that there was no choice but to embark on this campaign. Otherwise, we would have found ourselves facing even greater dangers in the future.

Members of Knesset, I see and hear those voices which express discontent, even disappointment, as if their expectations have yet to be realized. And I say to them and to all of us: friends, patience.

The struggle of the Zionist movement against terror, as with the free world's struggle with terror, did not begin today and will not end in the foreseeable future. This is a long, difficult, complex struggle which demands restraint, determination, stamina, and

perseverance. We all saw how much power there is in the stamina and patience demonstrated by the Israeli home front, an ability which surprised even our enemies. . . .

There were also shortcomings. We will have to examine ourselves in all the systems. I say here, first and foremost, to the IDF soldiers and their commanders, God forbid, never give up. You are the heroes of the people of Israel, and you will receive my full backing and support.

We will not hesitate to examine everything which requires examination. We will hide nothing, nor will we cover up. This is the lifeblood of a democratic society. However, we will not do this because of screaming and the hurling of accusations. We cannot afford the luxury of wallowing in wild arguments and mutual recriminations. We cannot afford this luxury because we must ensure that the next time—and there may well be a next time—things will be done better. Even if we think we learned all the lessons, even next time there will be things which must be fixed. Because, ladies and gentlemen, this is war.

UNITED STATES

D1. MICHAEL MASSING, "THE STORM OVER THE ISRAEL LOBBY," *New York Review of Books*, 8 JUNE 2006 (EXCERPTS).

Michael Massing, a contributing editor of the Columbia Journalism Review, writes frequently on the press and foreign affairs. The full text of his article is available at nybooks.com.

AIPAC [the American Israel Public Affairs Committee] claims to represent most of the Jewish community. Its executive committee has a couple of hundred members representing a wide spectrum of American Jewish opinion, from the dovish Americans for Peace Now to the militantly right-wing Zionist Organization of America. Four times a year this group meets to decide AIPAC policy. According to several former AIPAC officials I have talked to, however, the executive committee has little real power. Rather, power rests with the fifty-odd-member board of directors, which is selected not according to how well they represent AIPAC's members but according to how much money they give and raise.

Reflecting this, the board is thick with corporate lawyers, Wall Street investors, business executives, and heirs to family fortunes. Within the board itself, power

is concentrated in an extremely rich subgroup, known as the "minyan club." And, within that group, four members are dominant: Robert Asher, a retired lighting fixtures dealer in Chicago; Edward Levy, a building supplies executive in Detroit; Mayer "Bubba" Mitchell, a construction materials dealer in Mobile, Alabama; and Larry Weinberg, a real estate developer in Los Angeles (and a former owner of the Portland Trail Blazers). Asher, Levy, and Mitchell are loyal Republicans; Weinberg is a Scoop Jackson Democrat who has moved rightward over the years.

The "Gang of Four," as these men are known, do not share the general interest of a large part of the Jewish community in promoting peace in the Middle East. Rather, they seek to keep Israel strong, the Palestinians weak, and the United States from exerting pressure on Israel. AIPAC's director, Howard Kohr, is a conservative Republican long used to doing the Gang of Four's bidding. For many years Steven Rosen, AIPAC's director of foreign policy issues, was the main power on the staff, helping to shape the Gang of Four's pro-Likud beliefs into practical measures that AIPAC could promote in Congress. (In 2005, Rosen and fellow AIPAC analyst Keith Weissman left the organization and were soon after indicted by federal authorities for receiving classified national security information and passing it on to foreign [Israeli] officials.)

AIPAC's defenders like to argue that its success is explained by its ability to exploit the organizing opportunities available in democratic America. To some extent, this is true. AIPAC has a formidable network of supporters throughout the US. Its 100,000 members—up 60 percent from five years ago—are guided by AIPAC's nine regional offices, its ten satellite offices, and its one-hundred-person-plus Washington staff, a highly professional group that includes lobbyists, researchers, analysts, organizers, and publicists, backed by an enormous \$47 million annual budget. AIPAC's staff is famous on Capitol Hill for its skill in gathering up-to-the-minute information about Middle Eastern affairs and working it up into neatly digestible and carefully slanted policy packages, on which many congressional staffers have come to rely.

Such an account, however, overlooks a key element in AIPAC's success: money. AIPAC itself is not a political action committee. Rather, by assessing voting records and public statements, it provides information to such committees, which donate money to candidates; AIPAC helps them to

decide who Israel's friends are according to AIPAC's criteria. The Center for Responsive Politics, a nonpartisan group that analyzes political contributions, lists a total of thirty-six pro-Israel PACs, which together contributed \$3.14 million to candidates in the 2004 election cycle. Pro-Israel donors give many millions more. Over the last five years, for instance, Robert Asher, together with his various relatives (a common device used to maximize contributions), has donated \$148,000, mostly in sums of \$1,000 or \$2,000 to individual candidates. . . .

What AIPAC wants can be summed up very succinctly: a powerful Israel free to occupy the territory it chooses; enfeebled Palestinians; and unquestioning support for Israel by the United States. AIPAC is skeptical of negotiations and peace accords, along with the efforts by Israeli doves, the Palestinians, and Americans to promote them. During the 1980s, when Israel was aggressively expanding its presence on the West Bank, AIPAC had a very close relationship with the Israeli government, especially the Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir. That quickly changed in 1992, with the election of Labor's Yitzhak Rabin. On a visit to Washington soon after taking power, he admonished AIPAC for having cozy ties with the Likud. No longer, Rabin said, would the organization act as Jerusalem's representative in Washington.

When Rabin and Arafat signed the Oslo accords in 1993, AIPAC officially endorsed them, but—in contrast to its outspoken support of Likud policies—it remained largely silent. Seeing the Palestinians as terrorists who could not be trusted, the lobby looked for a way to subtly undermine the accords. It found one in the issue of where the U.S. embassy in Israel should be located. Unlike all but two countries in the world (Costa Rica and El Salvador), the United States had its embassy not in Jerusalem but in Tel Aviv, in recognition of Jerusalem's contested status. Under the Oslo accords, the city's final disposition was to be taken up in talks set to begin in May 1996 and to conclude three years later.

But pro-Israel activists in Congress were unwilling to wait. They got an unexpected boost in early 1995, when Republicans took control of the House. The new speaker, Newt Gingrich—casting about for ways to steer Jewish money and votes away from the Democrats—announced on a visit to Israel in January that he was going to support the transfer of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. In the Senate, Bob Dole, who had never

shown much regard for Israel but who was preparing to challenge Bill Clinton for the presidency, said at that year's AIPAC policy conference that he would support legislation mandating the transfer. He got a standing ovation.

Both Rabin and Bill Clinton were opposed to moving the embassy. They knew that such a step, by inflaming the Arab world, could disrupt the peace process. But for AIPAC and its allies, that was precisely the point. In October 1995 the Jerusalem Embassy Act overwhelmingly passed both houses of Congress. The act mandated the transfer of the embassy to Jerusalem by 1999, unless the president invoked a national security waiver. Unwilling to challenge AIPAC, President Clinton let the bill become law without signing it. As anticipated, vehement protests came from every Arab capital. Clinton duly invoked the waiver, so no transfer occurred, but every six months his administration had to submit to Congress a report explaining how it was complying with the law. And members of Congress, eager to demonstrate their support for Israel, continued to produce a stream of resolutions and letters demanding the embassy's transfer. The strain on the Oslo accords was intense.

It became even more so when Hillary Clinton decided to run for the Senate in New York. Wanting to court the all-important Jewish vote, she early on declared Jerusalem "the eternal and indivisible capital of Israel," and throughout the remainder of the race she and her Republican opponent Rick Lazio argued in synagogues and speeches over who would be the quickest to move the embassy to Jerusalem.

By then, Bill Clinton was overseeing the Camp David peace talks. Every time the issue of the embassy transfer was mentioned in the news, the Palestinians objected, and America's ability to serve as an honest broker was undermined. "I wasn't thrilled with their emphasis on moving the embassy," recalls Dennis Ross, Clinton's chief negotiator. As he observes, the Israel lobby ultimately did not succeed—the embassy was never moved—but the semiannual need to invoke the waiver and report to Congress "put a burden on us. It took up a lot of our time."

A Clinton Middle East adviser points to the embassy issue as an example of how the Israel lobby works. Like all lobbies, he says, it's "very effective at creating background noise." When an administration considers taking a position on some issue, it must weigh the potential gain against the

“downside”—the “constant barrage” from the press, Congress, and domestic interest groups. If it’s going to require a constant, time-consuming effort, “then you ask, is it worth it?” By raising the embassy issue over and over, AIPAC was able to create a lot of background noise.

In late 2000, when the intifada began, the former Clinton adviser told me, there were cases in which Israel used what seemed to many to be excessive force, such as breaking the bones of young Palestinians, and exacerbated the conflict in doing so. But if administration officials had said anything “that smacked of ‘moral equivalency,’” he observed, “it would have gotten us attacks from Congress, the media, and interest groups.” After a while, he continued, officials begin to shy away from saying anything that might become controversial domestically, leading to self-censorship in speech and action. There were many policy initiatives we were considering where we’d have to address how certain domestic constituencies would react. There was a sense of weighing what the costs would be of being viewed publicly as pressuring Israel.

As this official points out, while AIPAC focuses most of its efforts on Congress, the executive branch is more often lobbied by the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. This group is far less known than AIPAC but nearly as powerful. Made up of the heads of more than fifty American Jewish organizations, the Conference of Presidents is supposed to represent the collective voice of the American Jewish community, which, as noted, tends to be dovish on Middle East matters.

In practice, though, the organization is run by its executive vice-chairman, Malcolm Hoenlein, who has long been close to the settlers’ movement; for several years in the mid-1990s, he served as an associate chair for the annual fund-raising dinners held in New York for Bet El, a militant settlement near Ramallah. In his twenty years with the conference, Hoenlein has used it to make sure Israel has the right to pursue whatever policies it chooses—including expanding its presence on the West Bank—without any interference from the United States. During the Clinton years, the Conference of Presidents was an enthusiastic party to the campaign to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.

Sometimes, the former Clinton official noted, the pressures on US policy come from domestic groups, sometimes they come from Israel, and sometimes they come from

Israel using its allies in the US to influence administration policy. When Bibi Netanyahu was premier between 1996 and 1999, the former official recalls, “he made the implicit threat that he could mobilize allies on the Hill or on the Christian right if President Clinton did not do what he wanted.” Later, at Camp David, “Barak made a whole lot of calls when he felt he came under too much pressure—calls to allies in the Jewish community, and to politicians.”

Since 2001, the need to use such pressures has diminished, for George Bush generally shares AIPAC’s reluctance to try to bring Israelis and Palestinians together. But on those few occasions when the President has tried to do so, the lobby has moved quickly to discourage him. A good example occurred in April 2003, when Bush introduced his “road map” for the Middle East. The map stipulated a series of parallel steps that Israel and the Palestinians were to undertake simultaneously, leading to the creation of an independent Palestinian state by the year 2005. The plan reflected the administration’s conviction that, as it prepared to invade Iraq, it needed to show the Arab world that it was actively working to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. But the requirement that Israel take steps toward a settlement in conjunction with the Palestinians seemed to both AIPAC and the Sharon government an objectionable use of political pressure, and the lobby worked with its friends in Congress to issue a letter saying as much. The road map ultimately failed. This was caused by several factors, not least the continuing violence in the region, but the pressures from AIPAC certainly contributed.

Throughout all this, AIPAC has continued to organize resolutions, bills, and letters on Capitol Hill expressing fierce support for Israel and hostility toward its adversaries. More than a hundred such initiatives emerge from Congress every year, part of a cynical, routinized process designed to show a member’s fealty to Israel and thus his eligibility to receive pro-Israel funds. And it can be “suicidal” to resist, says M. J. Rosenberg, who is the Washington director of the Israel Policy Forum, which seeks US support for a two-state solution, and who worked for AIPAC between 1982 and 1986. He adds:

I worked on Capitol Hill for almost twenty years and, basically, criticizing AIPAC or defying it on some resolution is a sure way to get a staffer in serious trouble.

I don't think they can defeat a member of Congress, not even in New York, but for staffers, reporters, people like me who work for Jewish organizations, they will try to get you fired or block your chances of advancement. They issue threats and they definitely believe they are more important than members of Congress.

[...]

... The network with which AIPAC is associated, it should be said, does not constitute any sort of conspiracy or cabal; its various parts and members work independently and often take positions at odds with one another. Still, it would be foolish to ignore the very real ways in which their activities tend to reinforce one another as they agitate for a more muscular US presence in the Middle East and beyond.

One key part of the network is the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. AIPAC helped to create this think tank in 1985, with Martin Indyk, AIPAC's research director, becoming its first director. Today, the Washington Institute is fully independent of AIPAC, and there is some diversity among its fellows (Dennis Ross is one). Overall, though, its policies mirror AIPAC's. Its executive director, Robert Satloff, is a neo-conservative with very hawkish views on the Middle East. Its deputy director of research, Patrick Clawson, has been a leading proponent of regime change in Iran and of a US confrontation with Tehran over its nuclear program. (AIPAC features him as an expert on its Web site.) Raymond Tanter, an adjunct scholar at the institute, has been championing the MEK, or People's Mujaheddin, a shadowy group of Iranian guerrillas who want to overthrow the government in Tehran (and whom the State Department regards as terrorists). Members of the Washington Institute's board of advisers include Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, James Woolsey, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Mort Zuckerman, and Max Kampelman; its single most important source of funding is Larry Weinberg, one of AIPAC's Gang of Four, and his wife Barbi.

Kampelman, Kirkpatrick, Perle, and Woolsey also sit on the advisory board of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), which, as its Web site notes, seeks "to inform the American defense and foreign affairs community about the important role Israel can and does play in bolstering demo-

cratic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East." To describe its program more bluntly, JINSA seeks to educate gentile members of the Pentagon in the strategic value of Israel to the United States. About half its fifty-six board members are US generals and admirals. Other members include Stephen Solarz, who while a New York congressman worked tirelessly on Israel's behalf; Eric Cantor, the only Jewish Republican in the House, who in 2002 was named the chief deputy majority whip—part of the ongoing Republican program to lure pro-Israel dollars from the Democrats; and Stephen Bryen, a neoconservative who served under Richard Perle in Ronald Reagan's Pentagon and who is now a defense contractor.

Richard Perle, in addition to sitting on the boards of both the Washington Institute and JINSA, is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. So are Joshua Muravchik, a neocon who's also an adjunct scholar at the Washington Institute; Michael Rubin, an up-and-coming neocon who worked in the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans before becoming a political adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq; and Michael Ledeen, who helped to set up JINSA and who has spent the last several years seeking official US backing for regime change in Iran. Together with Morris Amitay, a former executive director of AIPAC, Ledeen is an important force at the Coalition for Democracy in Iran, another advocate for overthrowing the Iranian government. Muravchik, Tanter, and Woolsey are all listed as supporters on that coalition's Web site.

Michael Rubin, meanwhile, is also the editor of the *Middle East Quarterly*, which is published by the Middle East Forum, a think tank dedicated to fighting terrorism, countering Islamic extremism, and promoting pro-Israel views on college campuses. MEF was founded by Daniel Pipes, an energetic neoconservative whose views seem extreme even within that world. In 2002, Pipes created a Web site called Campus Watch, which "reviews and critiques" Middle East studies in North America "with an aim to improving them." (Initially, Campus Watch also encouraged students to take notes on lectures by professors critical of Israel, with the goal of "exposing" them on the MEF Web site, but this feature was dropped after it was widely condemned as a form of McCarthyism.) MEF's work on campuses parallels that of AIPAC's own college advocacy program.

Pipes is also an adjunct scholar at the Washington Institute as well as a columnist

for the *Jerusalem Post*, whose editorial page editor, Saul Singer, is a neoconservative and is married to Wendy Singer Senor, who runs AIPAC's Jerusalem office. She is the sister of Dan Senor, who was Paul Bremer's chief spokesman at the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.

Pipes is also a regular contributor to the *New York Sun*, which is co-owned by Bruce Kovner, a hedge fund manager who ranked ninety-third on *Forbes* magazine's list of the 400 richest Americans and who is the chairman of the American Enterprise Institute's board of trustees, and by the money manager Roger Hertog, who is a trustee of both AEI and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and who is a co-owner (along with former hedge fund manager Michael Steinhardt) of the *New Republic*. That magazine's editor in chief, Martin Peretz, another co-owner, also sits on the Washington Institute's board of advisers. One wonders if Kovner and Hertog approve of the ugliness of the *Sun*'s campaign against Mearsheimer and Walt.

D2. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, RADIO ADDRESS ON THE LEBANON CRISIS, WASHINGTON, 29 JULY 2006 (EXCERPTS).

President Bush's radio address is available in full at www.whitehouse.gov.

As we work to resolve this current crisis, we must recognize that Lebanon is the latest flashpoint in a broader struggle between freedom and terror that is unfolding across the region. For decades, American policy sought to achieve peace in the Middle East by promoting stability in the Middle East, yet these policies gave us neither. The lack of freedom in that region created conditions where anger and resentment grew, radicalism thrived, and terrorists found willing recruits. We saw the consequences on September the 11th, 2001, when terrorists brought death and destruction to our country, killing nearly 3,000 innocent Americans.

The experience of September the 11th made it clear that we could no longer tolerate the status quo in the Middle East. We saw that when an entire region simmers in violence, that violence will eventually reach our shores and spread across the entire world. The only way to secure our nation is to change the course of the Middle East—by fighting the ideology of terror and spreading the hope of freedom.

So we have launched a forward strategy for freedom in the broader Middle East,

and that strategy has set in motion a transformation that is changing millions of lives for the better. From Kabul to Baghdad, to Beirut, and beyond, we've seen the birth of democratic governments that are striving to serve their people, reject terror, and work for peace. We're also seeing those who oppose democracy fighting its progress with all the destructive power they can muster. We see this in Hizballah's attacks on Israel, in the suicide bombings that kill innocent Iraqis, and in al-Qa'ida's campaign of terror across the world.

The enemies of freedom have shown their ability to set back our efforts with deadly attacks, but ultimately they will fail. They will fail because courageous leaders in the region have stepped forward to defend freedom and set the Middle East on a better course. And they will fail because millions of people who have suffered decades of oppression and violence will choose to live in peace with their neighbors.

In Iraq, we will help Prime Minister Maliki's unity government defeat the terrorists, insurgents, and illegal militias and establish a democracy in the heart of the Middle East. In Lebanon, we will stand with the democratic government in its efforts to rid the country of terrorists and foreign influence and bring about a better life for the Lebanese people. In the Palestinian Territories, we will work with President Abbas to support the forces of moderation and achieve our shared vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.

This moment of conflict in the Middle East is painful and tragic. Yet it is also a moment of opportunity for broader change in the region. Transforming countries that have suffered decades of tyranny and violence is difficult, and it will take time to achieve. But the consequences will be profound—for our country and the world. When the Middle East grows in liberty and democracy, it will also grow in peace, and that will make America and all free nations more secure.

D3. EIGHTY-EIGHT U.S. SENATORS, LETTER TO THE EU COUNCIL SECRETARY-GENERAL REQUESTING THAT HIZBALLAH BE ADDED TO THE EU TERRORIST LIST, WASHINGTON, 3 AUGUST 2006.

Written by Senators Bill Nelson (D-FL) and Gordon Smith (R-OR) and cosigned by eighty-six other senators, the full text of

this letter to EU High Representative Javier Solana is available at billnelson.senate.gov.

Dear High Representative Solana:

We write today to urge the European Union to take immediate steps to add Hezbollah to the European List for the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism. This month's unprovoked attacks against Israeli civilians are the most recent reminder of Hezbollah's deadly nature.

Hezbollah has a long history of terrorist acts around the world—attacking U.S. and French forces, kidnapping Americans and other Westerners, hijacking airplanes, and attacking Israeli interests in Argentina. These are only a few examples, but they clearly demonstrate that Hezbollah is focused on killing innocent civilians as well as military forces. They also show that the threat from Hezbollah extends around the world and knows no borders.

Hezbollah's most recent actions—the unprovoked kidnapping of two Israel Defense Forces soldiers from Israeli territory and the continued firing of thousands of missiles into Israeli towns and cities aimed specifically at civilians—should conclusively demonstrate Hezbollah's nature as a terrorist organization. The resulting crisis threatens to destabilize the entire region as well as inflict suffering on millions of innocent civilians on both sides of the border.

Placing Hezbollah on the EU's List for the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism will not only have important symbolic value at such a difficult time, it will also further cut off funding sources and assets that are used to support Hezbollah's ongoing terrorist acts.

The United Nations Security Council acted in September 2004 with Resolution 1559, calling on Hezbollah to disarm so that it would no longer pose a threat to the democratically elected Lebanese government. It is time that the EU joins the international community in aggressively working to end funding and support for Hezbollah.

We appreciate your time and look forward to your response.

D4. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, REMARKS ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON LEBANON, WASHINGTON, 14 AUGUST 2006 (EXCERPTS).

President Bush's press conference, held at the State Department after meetings with members of his national

security team, is available in full at www.whitehouse.gov.

Friday's UN Security Council resolution on Lebanon is an important step forward that will help bring an end to the violence. The resolution calls for a robust international force to deploy to the southern part of the country to help Lebanon's legitimate armed forces restore the sovereignty of its democratic government over all Lebanese territory. As well, the resolution is intended to stop Hizballah from acting as a state within the state.

We're now working with our international partners to turn the words of this resolution into action. We must help people in both Lebanon and Israel return to their homes and begin rebuilding their lives without fear of renewed violence and terror.

America recognizes that civilians in Lebanon and Israel have suffered from the current violence, and we recognize that responsibility for this suffering lies with Hizballah. It was an unprovoked attack by Hizballah on Israel that started this conflict. Hizballah terrorists targeted Israeli civilians with daily rocket attacks. Hizballah terrorists used Lebanese civilians as human shields, sacrificing the innocent in an effort to protect themselves from Israeli response.

Responsibility for the suffering of the Lebanese people also lies with Hizballah's state sponsors, Iran and Syria. The regime in Iran provides Hizballah with financial support, weapons, and training. Iran has made clear that it seeks the destruction of Israel. We can only imagine how much more dangerous this conflict would be if Iran had the nuclear weapon it seeks.

Syria is another state sponsor of Hizballah. Syria allows Iranian weapons to pass through its territory into Lebanon. Syria permits Hizballah's leaders to operate out of Damascus and gives political support to Hizballah's cause. Syria supports Hizballah because it wants to undermine Lebanon's democratic government and regain its position of dominance in the country. That would be a great tragedy for the Lebanese people and for the cause of peace in the Middle East.

Hezbollah and its foreign sponsors also seek to undermine the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Hizballah terrorists kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, Hamas kidnapped another Israeli soldier for a reason. Hizballah and Hamas reject the vision of

two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security. Both groups want to disrupt the progress being made toward that vision by Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas and others in the region. We must not allow terrorists to prevent elected leaders from working together toward a comprehensive peace agreement in the Middle East. . . .

In both Lebanon and Iraq, elected governments are contending with rogue armed groups that are seeking to undermine and destabilize them. In Lebanon, Hizballah declared war on Lebanon's neighbor, Israel, without the knowledge of the elected government in Beirut. In Iraq, al-Qa'ida and death squads engage in brutal violence to undermine the unity government. And in both these countries, Iran is backing armed groups in the hope of stopping democracy from taking hold.

The message of this administration is clear: America will stay on the offense against al-Qa'ida. Iran must stop its support for terror. And the leaders of these armed groups must make a choice: If they want to participate in the political life of their countries, they must disarm. Elected leaders cannot have one foot in the camp of democracy and one foot in the camp of terror.

The Middle East is at a pivotal moment in its history. The death and destruction we see shows how determined the extremists are to stop just and modern societies from emerging in the region. Yet millions of people in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are equally determined to live in peace and freedom. They have tired of the false promises and grand illusions of radical extremists. They reject the hateful vision of the terrorists, and they dream of a better future for their children and their grandchildren. We're determined to help them achieve that dream. . . .

Q: There is a perception, a global perception, certainly in the Arab media and in many Western media, as well, that Hizballah is really a winner here because they have proven that they could, as a guerilla force, withstand the Israeli army. They have been the sole source of humanitarian aid to many of the Lebanese people in the south. So they've improved their position politically within Lebanon, and militarily, and globally. They've gotten an aura of being able to stand up for so long against Israel. How do you combat that, and the perception that we settled for less than we

originally wanted in the U.N. resolution, a less robust force? And what actions can the United States or this international force take if Iran, for instance, tries to rearm Hizballah?

Yes. First of all, if I were Hizballah I'd be claiming victory, too. But the people around the region and the world need to take a step back and recognize that Hizballah's action created a very strong reaction that, unfortunately, caused some people to lose their life, innocent people to lose their life. But on the other hand, it was Hizballah that caused the destruction.

People have got to understand—and it will take time, Andrea, it will take time for people to see the truth—that Hizballah hides behind innocent civilians as they attack. What's really interesting is the mind-sets of this crisis. Israel, when they aimed at a target and killed innocent citizens, were upset. Their society was aggrieved. When Hizballah's rockets killed innocent Israelis they celebrated. I think when people really take a look at the type of mentality that celebrates the loss of innocent life, they'll reject that type of mentality.

And so, Hizballah, of course, has got a fantastic propaganda machine and they're claiming victories and—but how can you claim victory when at one time you were a state within a state, safe within southern Lebanon, and now you're going to be replaced by a Lebanese army and an international force? And that's what we're now working on, is to get the international force in southern Lebanon.

None of this would have happened, by the way, had Resolution 1559 been fully implemented. Now is the time to get it implemented. And it's going to take a lot of work. No question about it. And no question that it's a different kind of war than people are used to seeing. We're fighting the same kind of war. We don't fight the armies of nation states; we fight terrorists who kill innocent people to achieve political objectives. And it's a hard fight and requires different tactics. And it requires solid will from those of us who understand the stakes.

The world got to see what it means to confront terrorism. I mean, it's the challenge of the twenty-first century. The fight against terror, a group of ideologues, by the way, who use terror to achieve an objective—this is the challenge. And that's why, in my remarks, I spoke about the need for those of

us who understand the blessings of liberty to help liberty prevail in the Middle East. And the fundamental question is, can it? And my answer is, absolutely, it can. I believe that freedom is a universal value. And by that I mean people want to be free. One way to put it is, I believe mothers around the world want to raise their children in a peaceful world. That's what I believe. . . .

Q: I'm sorry. How can the international force or the United States, if necessary, prevent Iran from resupplying Hizballah?

The first step is—and part of the mandate in the UN resolution was to secure Syria's borders. Iran is able to ship weapons to Hizballah through Syria. Secondly is to deal—is to help seal off the ports around Lebanon. In other words, there's—part of the mandate and part of the mission of the troops, the UNIFIL troops will be to seal off the Syrian border.

But, as well, there's a diplomatic mission that needs to be accomplished. The world must now recognize that it's Iranian sponsorship of Hizballah that exacerbated the situation in the Middle East. People are greatly concerned about the loss of innocent life, as are the Americans—American people. We care deeply about that, the fact that innocents lost their life. But it's very important to remember how this all happened. And Hizballah has been emboldened because of its state sponsors.

I know they claim they didn't have anything to do with it, but sophisticated weaponry ended up in the hands of Hizballah fighters, and many assume, and many believe that that weaponry came from Iran through Syria.

And so the task is more than just helping the Siniora government; the task is also—and the task is not just America's alone, the task is the world's—and that is to continually remind the Iranians of their obligations, their obligations not to develop a nuclear weapons program, their obligations not to foster terrorism and promote terrorism. . . .

Q: The U.N. resolution says that Israel must stop all offensive action. What do you view as defensive action? If Hizballah—

Somebody shoots at an Israeli soldier. . . .

Q: Any way Israel responds to that, if they start another ground offensive, that is all defensive?

I'm not going to—I keep getting asked a lot about Israel's military decisions, and we don't advise Israel on its military options. But, as far as I'm concerned, if somebody shoots at an Israeli soldier, tries to kill a soldier from Israel, that Israel has the right to defend herself, has a right to try to suppress that kind of fire. And that's how I read the resolution. That's how Ms. Rice reads the resolution.

Q: Mr. President, to much of the rest of the world, the United States appeared to tolerate the bloodshed and ongoing fighting for a long time before assertively stepping in, and in the process, perhaps earned the further enmity of a lot of people in the rest of the world, particularly the Arab and Muslim world. What is your thought about that?

My thought is that, first of all, we, from the beginning, urged caution on both sides so that innocent life would be protected. And, secondly, I think most leaders around the world would give Condoleezza Rice and her team great credit for finally getting a UN resolution passed. We were working hard on a UN resolution pretty quickly, and it can be a painful process, diplomacy can be a painful process. And it took a while to get the resolution done. But most objective observers would give the United States credit for helping to lead the effort to get a resolution that addressed the root cause of the problem. Of course, we could have got a resolution right off the bat that didn't address the root cause. Everybody would have felt better for a quick period of time, and then the balance would have erupted again.

And our hope is that this series of resolutions that gets passed gets after the root cause. We want peace, Bill. We're not interested in process. What we want is results. And so—look, America gets accused of all kinds of things. I understand that. But if people analyze the facts, they were to find two things: One, we urged caution, and two, secondly, that we worked on a diplomatic process that we believe has got the best chance of achieving a long-term objective, which is peace.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.